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PREFACE 
Hie ethical drug industry has received considerable 
attention both from academic researchers and government 
investigators. A focal point for this interest is the 
industry's high rate of return relative to other manu¬ 
facturing industries. In spite of this extensive cover¬ 
age, studies of the industry's return on investment have 
ignored important economic and financial variables. Con¬ 
sequently, this study considers the effects of certain 
previously suggested variables on return on investment in 
general and on the ethical drug industry's rate in par¬ 
ticular. 
Hie goal of this study, then, is to add to our 
knowledge regarding rate of return and its determinants. 
It is not the intent here either to criticize or defend 
the drug industry regarding rate of return or any other 
matter. Whether an industry's return on investment is 
excessive can only be decided with reference to normative 
Judgements by social and political decision-makers. 
Hie writer's interest in the drug industry results 
from exposure to prior research conducted by Professor 
Alexander Barges. An acknowledgement of gratitude is 
due to Professor Barges and to Professors James B. 
Ludtke, H. Richard Hartzler, and Donald G. Frederick, all 
iv 
of the University of Massachusetts, for their help in 
producing this study. Professors Willard T. Carleton 
and Thoxnas Warren of Dartmouth College were most helpful 
in the acquisition of data from the Compustat Tape, The 
use of the computer facilities at Nichols College is 
gratefully acknowledged. Two colleagues at Nichols 
College, Professors James L, Conrad, Jr,, and Kenneth M. 
Parzych read the manuscript and offered many helpful 
comments. The responsibility for errors in the final 
result remains my own. My wife, Carolyn, provided 
encouragement and support throughout the project. 
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The ethical drug industry has been under continuous 
study by governmental investigators and academic researchers 
for some time. The focal point of many of these studies is 
the industry’s relatively high rate of return on investment 
(ROI). High rates are often cited as an indication, if not 
proof, of noncompetitive behavior. However, there is 
little agreement regarding the definition of ROI, the 
determinants of ROI, and the proper method for making inter¬ 
industry ROI comparisons. Ihese issues are examined and a 
model is developed to study the ethical drug industry’s 
return on investment. 
Regression techniques are utilized to test the invest¬ 
ment and structural characteristics as potential determinants 
of ROI. The hypothesized association with ROI is supported 
for the two risk measures and for growth in demand but 
rejected for the concentration ratio, average company size, 
and R&D intensity. 
The three measures of investment characteristics are 
combined into a cross-sectional, multiple regression equation 
giving a model of ROI which is used to study the drug 
2 
Industry's rate of return. Data for the industry are intro¬ 
duced into the model to obtain a forecast of rate of return 
with variance, skewness, and growth held constant. Com¬ 
paring the forecast with the observed rate shows observed 
ethical drug Industry average KOI to be below the rate that 
could result given the particular set of investment charac¬ 
teristics exhibited by the drug industry sample. Therefore, 
the hypothesis is accepted that ethical drug industry 
average ROI is the same as a11-manufacturing Industries 
average ROI after consideration of Investment characteristics. 
There are several possible explanations for why this 
model can explain statistically drug industry ROI: First, 
data are utilized only for firms primarily engaged in the 
manufacture of ethical drug products rather than data for 
both ethical and proprietary drug firms. Second, more 
recent data may reflect changed economic relationships, 
both within the drug industry and between the drug and other 
industries. Third, the model formulated includes more 
variables than prior models. Fourth, explicit considera¬ 
tion is made of possible statistical errors in both the 
regression equation and in the ROI forecast. 
V 
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CHAPTER I 
THE ETHICAL DRUG INDUSTRY 
The ethical drug industry is composed of firms whose 
main source of revenue is the sale of prescription drugs. 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to designate a company as 
belonging strictly to the ethical drug industry because 
most drug companies manufacture nonprescription, pro¬ 
prietary drugs as well as ethical drug products. This 
problem is met by selecting firms from the ethical drug 
classification on Standard and Poor’s Coinpus tat Tape. To 
be included in this classification, a firm must have pre¬ 
scription drugs as its primary source of revenue.* 
For some time considerable attention has been focused 
on the ethical drug industry’s high rate of return relative 
2 
to that of other manufacturing industries. The results of 
earlier analyses by federal agencies and nongovernmental 
*For a list of the firms included in the ethical drug 
sample, see Appendix II. No data are available regarding 
what percentage of ethical drug companies’ revenues come 
from ethical drugs and what percentage is derived from other 
products. It is unlikely that ethical drugs account for less 
than 60 to 65 percent of the revenues of the firms sampled. 
2 
See Chapter VI and Appendix II for graphical and 
statistical comparisons of ROI for the ethical drug industry 
and for the a11-manufacturing industries samples. 
2 
sources confirm this relatively high return, but there 
remain varying opinions regarding the contributing factors 
involved. This study seeks to identify and test statis¬ 
tically measurable variables that on logical grounds could 
conceivably explain industry rate of return. 
Industry Characteristics 
Much of the attention received by the ethical drug 
industry results from its unique characteristics. Atten¬ 
tion has been focused in particular on relatively high 
return on investment, intensive promotional and research 
activity, and inelastic demand. 
Considerable potential for monopolistic behavior, 
which can result in high rates of return, is created by the 
importance of health to the individual and by the nature of 
the channels of drug distribution. The ethical pharma¬ 
ceutical industry is not subject to the usual consumer con¬ 
trol, for once a drug is prescribed, the individual auto¬ 
matically purchases it.^ As health is involved, price is 
generally of little importance in the purchase of prescrip¬ 
tion drugs, and therefore, the industry faces a condition 
of relative price inelasticity. 
^Demand elasticity for drugs is discussed in Mickey C. 
Smith, Principles of Pharmaceutical Marketing (Philadelphia: 
Lea and ^ebiger, 1971)• 
3 
Similarly, the industry is characterized by income 
inelasticity evidenced by the fact that drug purchases are 
about equal for low- and high-income groups. As shown in 
Table 1, mean gross drug expenditures range from $30 for 
families with incomes below $2000 to $52 for those having 
over $7500 incomes. This small range is in contrast to the 
range of $165 to $4.11 in gross health expenditures per 
family. 
Attempts to control the ethical drug industry are 
helped by the relative inelasticity of demand for pharma¬ 
ceutical products. Competition based on price is supplanted 
by product differentiation and high promotional expenditures, 
both of which are characteristics of noncompetitive indus¬ 
tries. 
Intensive promotional efforts aimed at physicians 
contribute to the industry*s control over product promotion 
and distribution.^" As the consumer is not directly involved 
in the selection of a drug, the manufacturer must convince 
only the prescribing physician that its brand-name product 
is the best for a particular disease or condition. Since 
physicians are readily identified, they are easily contacted 
by pharmaceutical firms through salesmen, direct mail, and 
^For a detailed description of the way pharmaceutical 
products are marketed, see Bernard G. Keller and Mickey C. 
Smith, eds.. Pharmaceutical Marketing (Baltimore: Williams 
and Wilkins, 1969). 
1+ 
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5 
advertising in medical journals. The intensity of these 
promotional efforts is indicated by the drug industry’s 
high rank in inter-industry comparisons of advertising and 
promotional intensity. 
Another unique characteristic of the ethical drug 
industry is its relatively high outlays for research and 
development (RAD) activity. Table 2 shows that the industry 
allocates RAD expense at the rate of J+.5 to 5.6 percent of 
sales in contrast to an a11-manufacturing average of 1.9 to 
2.0 percent. Such intense research activity in conjunction 
with the patent privilege can give existing pharmaceutical 
manufacturers a significant advantage over potential entrants 
into the drug industry. As research can be a barrier to 
competitive entry, high RAD intensity may provide a non¬ 
competitive advantage that can be exploited to gain a 
high rate of return.^ 
While various structural characteristics are often 
cited as indications that the ethical drug industry is not 
competitive, relatively high rate of return on investment 
is commonly used as a summary measure for monopolistic 
^For example, see Jules Backman, Advertising and Com¬ 
petition (New York: NYU Press, 1967). There is additional 
discussion of advertising and promotion in Chapter IV. 
^Research and development intensity is discussed in 
detail in Chapter IV. 
6 
TABLE 2 
INDUSTRY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT INTENSITY41 
Industry w 
Percent 
l%4 
Food and Kindred Products b b 0.4 
Textiles and Apparel 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Paper and Allied Products 0.8 0.7 0.7 
Industrial Chemicals 4.1 4.2 3.9 
Petroleum—Refining and Extracting 1.2 1.0 0.9 
Rubber Products 1.6 1.0 1.7 
Stone, Clay, and Glass Products 1.6 1.6 1.6 
Primary Metals 0.7 0.7 0.7 
Fabricated Metal Products 1.4 1.3 1.2 
Machinery 3.1 3-2 3.1 
Electrical Equipment 3.6 3.6 3.6 
Transportation Equipment 2.5 2.6 z'} Aircraft and Missiles 2.6 2.5 3-4 
Professional & Scientific Instruments kii 
All-Manufacturing Industries— Mean 1.9 2.0 2.0 
Ethical and Proprietary Drugs 4.5 5.6 5.4 
aR&D expense as a percent of net sales. Company 
outlays only; government outlays not included. 
^Not available. 
Source: U.S., National Science Foundation, Basic Research, 
Applied Research and Development in Industry, 1969 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1970), p. 81. 
7 
behavior.^ It is the industry’s high return on investment 
along with high research outlays, intensive promotional 
activity, inelastic demand, and other indications of a 
noncompetitive situation that has led to the many investiga¬ 
tions and studies. 
Studies of the Industry 
The first extensive review of the ethical drug in¬ 
dustry was initiated in 1959 when the Senate Subcommittee 
on Antitrust and Monopoly, with Estes Kefauver as Chairman, 
o 
investigated the monopolistic aspects of the industry. 
These hearings were wide-ranging and covered such topics as 
differential prices of brand-name and generic-name drugs, 
the role of patents, the comparison of foreign and U.S. 
?For example, see U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee 
on Monopoly, Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry, 
statement submitted by Willard F. kueller (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1968), pp. 1807-1861; and Estes 
Kefauver, In a Few Hands--Monopoly Power in America 
(Baltimore: Penguin, 1965). 
®U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Antitrust 
and Monopoly, Administered Prices in the Drug Industry 
(Washington, D.dJ.: Government Printing Office, I960). 
The following are discussions of the hearings: Richard 
Harris, The Real Voice (New York: Macmillan, I96I4.) ; 
Kefauver, in a ffew Hands; and William S. Comanor, ”The 
Drug Industry and Medical Research: Ihe Economics of the 
Kefauver Committee Investigations,” Journal of Business 
(January, 1966), pp. 12-18. 
8 
Q 
prices, and extensive promotional activity.7 Concluding 
that the anti-competitive aspects of the industry required 
attention, the Kefauver Committee recommended corrective 
legislation designed to force the lowering of drug prices 
and industry rate of return.10 The resulting Kefauver- 
Harris Act, passed in 1962, basically followed the Com¬ 
mittee^ proposals, although a key provision requiring 
compulsory patent licensing was omitted. However, the 
legislation failed to bring about any appreciable decline 
in the drug industry* s rate of return. 
This failure to reduce return on investment resulted 
in another major set of hearings by Senator Gaylord Nelson*s 
Subcommittee on Monopoly. The main recommendations by 
^As different brand-name drugs may closely resemble 
one another as regards chemical composition, they are grouped 
together under a common or generic name. This generic name, 
of course, is not the possession of any company and is not 
patentable• 
10The following were identified by the Committee as 
being indicative of lack of competition: monopoly pricing 
under patents, lower foreign prices for identical products, 
identical prices for different companies’ products, and 
high ROI. The Committee's recommendations were that use of 
generic-name drugs be encouraged, that the existence of side 
effects be included in advertising, that there be compulsory 
patent licensing after three years, and that the Food and 
Drug Administration be given increased regulatory powers. 
^See Chapter VI and Appendix II for graphical and 
statistical evidence of the trend of drug industry ROI from 
1963 to 1971. 
12 
Hie hearings which were conducted from 1967 through 
1972 were compiled in U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee 
on Monopoly, Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967-1972). 
9 
witnesses critical of the industry were to encourage the 
use of generic-name drugs and to restrict the patent priv¬ 
ilege. As the hearings were only recently concluded, no 
corrective legislation has been passed as yet. 
Unfortunately, investigation of the drug industry has 
been complicated by political overtones, which is under¬ 
standable given the importance of health to individuals 
and to society. An academic researcher who is generally 
critical of the drug industry observed: 
The hearings constitute an interesting and often 
fascinating contribution to the literature of politics, 
but are here and there notably incomplete as an exer¬ 
cise in applied economic analysis. In part this is due 
to the periodic interference of moral indignation when 
giving and taking testimony, for the issues investigated 
were highly controversial. . . .^3 
Additional studies have resulted from the publicity 
generated by the Senate hearings. In general, the focus has 
been on the structural and investment characteristics of the 
industry and on how these characteristics are associated with 
the industry*s high return on investment.1^ For example. 
Professor Seymour Harris of Harvard asks. 
^%enry B. Steele, ”Patent Restriction and Price Com¬ 
petition in the Ethical Drugs Industry,” Journal of Industrial 
Economics (July, 1964), p. 198. 
■^Structural characteristics refer to the way the 
industry is organized, particularly in regard to concentra¬ 
tion and barriers to competitive entry. Investment charac¬ 
teristics are the distinctive features of an investment, 
such as risk and growth in demand, that capital suppliers 
assess when evaluating a project's expected rate of return. 
10 
Is it appropriate that a public-utility industry should 
be subject to such large areas of monopoly, . . . 
unusually high profits ...» and yet be free of any 
substantial regulation of monopoly practices?1^ 
Harris, like Kefauver, favors modification of the patent 
laws and the dampening of demand for brand-name ethical 
drugs with the hope of reducing prices and rates of return. 
The effects of patents and promotional activity on 
drug industry return on investment have been extensively 
studied by Professor Henry Steele of the University of 
Houston. He recommends uncompromising legislation to 
correct ”, . . misallocation of resources in excessive 
selling efforts, duplicative research and product develop¬ 
ment programs, and exceptionally high profit levels. 
„16 
• • # 
In an empirical study, the probable effects of several 
commonly suggested policy changes are assessed by Hugh 
17 
Walker. His conclusion is that the net social benefits 
"^Seymour E. Harris, The Economics of American 
Medicine (New York: Macmillan, 1964), p. 99. 
^U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Monopoly, 
Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry, statement sub¬ 
mitted by Henry £. Steele, p. 197(5. Professor Steele, who 
has a Ph.D. in Industrial Economics from MIT has done much 
research in the areas of medical economics and drug industry 
regulation. 
■^Hugh D. Walker, Market Power and Price Levels in the 
Ethical Drug Industry (Bloomington, In.: Indiana University 
Press, 197lT« Walker is currently Visiting Professor of 
Economics at the University of Toronto. The empirical work 
was the basis for a Ph.D. dissertation completed by the 
author at Vanderbilt University in 1967* 
11 
would be small from 1) removal of drug brand-names; 
2) removal of drug patents; or 3) removal of both. 
Investment characteristics such as risk and growth in 
demand have been emphasized in other studies of the drug 
industry. An example is the attempt by Gordon Conrad and 
Irving Plotkin of the A. D. Little Company to measure the 
1 ft 
risk premium in rate of return. ° Using regression tech¬ 
niques to hold risk constant, they compare drug industry 
and average all-manufacturing rates of return. Although 
the drug industry is found to be relatively risky, the 
risk variable does not explain the excess of the industry’s 
rate of return over that of the a11-manufacturing sample. 
Growth in demand is considered as a determinant of 
drug industry return on investment by Alexander Barges and 
19 
Brian Hickey. In attempting to explain statistically 
the industry's relatively high rate of return, the authors 
find growth in demand to be a significant determinant. How¬ 
ever, using a growth variable, they are able to explain only 
about one-third of the difference between drug industry and 
lfi 
Gordon R. Conrad and Irving H. Plotkin, "Risk/Return: 
U.S. Industry Pattern,” Harvard Business Review (March-April, 
1968), pp. 90-99. This article is discussed in more detail 
in Chapter III. 
^Alexander Barges and Brian R. Hickey, "Drug Industry 
Profits," Financial Analysts Journal (May-June, 19o8), 
pp. 75*83* When the article was written, the authors were, 
respectively, Associate Professor of Finance and Faculty 
Research Assistant at the University of Massachusetts. See 
Chapter III for additional discussion of this study. 
12 
average a11-manufacturing rates of return. 
Prior studies have not satisfactorily explained ethical 
/ 
drug industry rate of return, because either determinants of 
return on investment were ignored or no more than one or two 
determinants were considered simultaneously. In particular, 
investment and structural characteristics have not been con¬ 
sidered jointly in any single significant research. 
The purpose of this study is to develop a model that 
can be used to study the ethical drug industry's rate of 
return on investment. To do this requires: 1) the evalua¬ 
tion and empirical testing of variables associated with rate 
of return including risk, growth, concentration, company 
size, R&D intensity, and promotional intensity; 2) the 
assembly of these determinants into a model of return; 
3) the use of the model in an attempt to explain statis¬ 
tically the drug industry's rate of return. No attempt will 
be made to determine whether or not drug industry returns 
are excessive, since this can only be normatively estab¬ 
lished with reference to social and economic values. 
By providing additional understanding of return on 
investment and its determinants, this study will aid social 
and political decision-makers in making judgements regarding 
whether a particular industry should be more closely 
PC) 
These determinants are defined as those measurable 
investment and structural characteristics that are contrib¬ 
uting factors to explaining rate of return. 
13 
regulated. This increased understanding should be par¬ 
ticularly useful in reference to the drug industry, which 
is characterized by ongoing controversy regarding its 
relatively high rate of return. 
CHAPTER II 
RETURN ON INVESTMENT 
Return on investment is a widely used measure of how 
well capital suppliers are rewarded for the use of their 
resources.1 To calculate return on investment (ROI), a 
profit figure is divided by the amount of capital invested: 
ROI = PROFIT/INVESTMENT 
The resulting figure can be ambiguous since different com¬ 
monly used definitions for both profit and investment pro- 
2 
duce varying measurements for rate of return. 
One Interpretive ambiguity is the profit variable 
which appears In the numerator of the ROI fraction. Using 
income before taxes eliminates the effects of taxes. In¬ 
come before financial costs reflects return without the 
influence of leverage (financial risk). Income after taxes 
^For example, ROI is used as a means of inter-industry 
comparisons in Aerospace Research Center, Aerospace Profits 
Vs♦ Risks (Washington, D.C.: Aerospace Industries Asso- 
elation of America, 1971); and in George J. Stigler, Capital 
and Rates of Return in Manufacturing Industries (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1963). 
2 
It is not proper to combine just any profit or income 
figure with just any investment figure. The logic of 
accounting conventions produces relationships between par¬ 
ticular income and investment accounts. Examples of such 
logical pairings are net operating income with total 
operating assets and net income after taxes with stock¬ 
holders' equity. 
15 
is affected by both tax law and leverage. Other definitions 
of profit similarly have unique interpretations. 
/ 
The definition of the capital base is also a source of 
ambiguity for ROI since different figures have different 
interpretations as to the efficiency of an investment. To 
contribute further to the interpretive complexity, the in¬ 
vestment figures are balance sheet items and can be measured 
at the beginning-of-the-year, end-of-the-year, or the two 
can be averaged.^ 
Differences in depreciation practice also affect return 
on investment. Assuming the use of net fixed assets, depre¬ 
ciation expense is a current deduction from income which is 
offset by an equal reduction in capital invested. As the 
depreciation schedule is not necessarily the same as the 
rate of wearing out or obsolescence of assets, depreciation 
deductions can distort the relation between accounting in¬ 
come and economic rate of return. A study by Thomas Stauffer 
concludes that accounting rate of return (after depreciation) 
is a poor measure for economic rate of return.^ Another 
^Por a discussion of the possible effects of using 
beginning- or end-of-the-year figures along with a numerical 
example, see Alexander Barges and Brian R. Hickey, ”Drug 
Industry Profits,” Financial Analysts Journal (May-June, 
1968), p. 80. 
^•Thomas R. Stauffer, ”The Measurement of Corporate Rates 
of Return: A Generalized Formulation,” The Bell Journal of 
Economics and Management Science (Autumn, 1971), pp. 434--4&9. 
fhe profit figure used to calculate economic rate of return 
would reflect a depreciation deduction just sufficient to 
replace the capital used up in generating revenue during the 
profit period. 
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study presents evidence that, 
... in long-run equilibrium the forces of competition 
tend to equalize "cash returns" rather than "accounting 
returns." The rate-of-return calculation which excludes 
depreciation deductions approximates the "cash rate of 
return on gross assets."5 
The question of which ROI measure is most appropriate 
for use in comparisons of return on investment is unresolved 
with different researchers arriving at conflicting conclu¬ 
sions. Marshall Hall and Leonard Weiss argue for the use 
of return after taxes divided by stockholders’ equity because 
they believe that capital structure is an integral part of 
the mix of inputs.^ They conclude that different capital 
structures produce different rates of return on assets even 
in competitive equilibrium, and therefore, rates of return 
on equity, not return on total assets, would be expected to 
be equalized.^ 
Return on equity is rejected in another study because 
q 
the measure does not consider the debt-to-equity ratio. 
^Barges and Hickey, "Drug Industry Profits," p. 82. 
^Marshall Hall and Leonard Weiss, "Firm Size and 
Profitability," Review of Economics and Statistics (August, 
1967), pp. 319-3TH 
"^Return after taxes to stockholders' equity is used 
also in I. N. Fisher and G. R. Hall, "Risk and Corporate 
Plates of Return," Quarterly Journal of Economics (February, 
1969), pp. 79-92. However, no explicit rationale is given. 
8 
Aerospace Research Center, Aerospace Profits Vs. 
Risks. 
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Return on total assets is used instead to eliminate financial 
q 
risk as a variable and to focus on business risk. As out¬ 
lined above, similar reasoning regarding leverage by Hall 
and Weiss leads them to prefer the return on equity measure. 
In an extensive study of rates of return in manufac¬ 
turing industries, George Stigler used income after taxes 
plus interest divided by total assets, arguing that rate of 
return on equity ignores debt capital suppliers’ attitudes 
1 C 
about risk and return. v Stigler conceded that the decision 
to use return on total assets is made in the face of many 
unanswered questions regarding the influence of capital 
structure on ROI. 
With no apparent agreement on what constitutes the 
best definition of return on investment for inter-industry 
comparisons, the choice of a measure is up to each individual 
researcher’s judgement and rationale for his particular study. 
The definition used in this research is net income after 
taxes divided by net worth.11 
^Business risk is the uncertainty or variability of 
return inherent in an economic undertaking. 
■^Stigler, Capital and Rates of Return. 
llfrhe rationale for the choice of net income after 
taxes divided by net worth is presented in Chapter V. In 
Chapter VI, the possible effects of different capital struc¬ 
tures are considered by including the debt ratio as an inde¬ 
pendent variable and by introducing return on total assets 
into the regression model. 
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Relation to Capital Supply 
There are well established concepts regarding the rewards 
that go to those who supply resources for the productive 
process. The total reward flow from an economic undertaking 
is divided into wages, rent, interest, and profit, with 
profit as a balancing item. Profit, therefore, is a 
residual and can range from a negative amount to a positive 
12 
figure well above normal. 
The flow of money capital from surplus spenders (who 
spend less than their incomes) to deficit spenders (who 
spend more than their incomes) varies considerably over time 
in response to political, social, and economic variables, 
with expected rate of return being particularly important. 
To induce investment in a given project, capital suppliers 
require a minimum rate of return which is determined by 
pure interest plus a premium associated with any undesirable 
11 
investment characteristics inherent in the project. This 
12 
To the accountant, profit is the revenue remaining 
after subtracting out costs. To the economist, a normal 
profit is the reward to the supplier of equity capital and 
is, therefore, a cost. Return above the normal level is 
called pure or excess profit. 
13 ̂For a discussion of required rate of return, see 
William F. Sharpe, "Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market 
Equilibrium under Conditions of Risk," Journal of Finance 
(September, 19614.), pp. 425-I4I42; Lawrence F’isher, ,rDe ter- 
minants of Risk Premiums on Corporate Bonds," Journal of 
Political Economy (June, 1959), pp. 217-237; and Donald S. 
Watson, Price Theory and Its Uses (New York: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1963), Chapter 5. 
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required rate of return has at least three identifiable 
levels: The first level is a minimum rate established by 
administrative costs, time preference, or liquidity pref¬ 
erence below which investors will not supply any capital. 
The second level is determined by opportunity costs as 
rational investors will not commit capital to a project 
that offers a lower ROI than an alternative project with 
the same investment characteristics. The third level is 
the maximum rate obtainable from any project with a given 
set of investment characteristics. 
The first level of required rate of return is estab¬ 
lished by investors' attitudes regarding capital invest¬ 
ment, but the second and third levels are based on indivi¬ 
dual companies' financial results. Although capital sup¬ 
pliers receive their return as interest, dividends, or 
capital gains with their preferences determined by the tax 
structure and brokerage costs, the fact remains that the 
reward for contributing capital ultimately comes from the 
profitability of the firm. 
Normal Rate of Return 
The theory of pure competition includes the proposition 
that rate of return regulates investment to produce the most 
efficient allocation of capital. If there is insufficient 
investment to meet consumer demand, prices are expected to 
be bid up which increases ROI and attracts additional capital. 
20 
Eventually, according to the theory, prices decline or costs 
increase until rate of return is again at the normal level 
/ 
with no excess profit. 
Based on the theory of a normal rate of return, some 
economists believe the existence of an apparently stable ROI 
above the normal or average can result only from monopolistic 
behavior.^ These economists assume that the most likely 
explanation for relatively high industry rate of return is 
that existing firms have blocked competitive entry, and 
therefore, stable, above-average rates are proof of a non¬ 
competitive situation. An above average ROI may, of course, 
result from industry structural characteristics which can 
be barriers to entry themselves without any anti-competitive 
behavior on the part of existing firms. For example, high 
capital or technological requirements for efficient produc¬ 
tion can prohibit competitive entry. 
Hie veracity of attributing above-average rates of 
return to a lack of competition has been questioned. For 
instance, Stigler asks: 
What is the nature of the proposition that under 
competition there is a tendency for rates of return 
on investments in various industries to approach 
equality? It has been taken by some economists as a 
definition of competition; persistently high profits 
lf+For an example of this viewpoint, see U.S., Congress, 
Senate, Subcommittee on Monopoly, Competitive Problems in the 
Drug Industry, statement submitted by Willard F. Mueller — 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1968), 
pp. 1806-1861. 
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in an industry would be proof that the industry is not 
competitive. But this usage is one-sided: no one 
would argue that the existence of the average rate of 
return in an industry proved that the industry is 
competitive.15 
A competitive but high-risk industry might have a higher 
than average rate of return as compensation for above average 
risks. A noncompetitive industry may exhibit a below average 
ROI because of changes in product demand to which it is dif¬ 
ficult to adapt. This has been explained by Stanley 
Ornstein as follows: 
The pure theory of competition and monopoly does 
not provide a basis for the traditional hypothesis 
that with few rivals a firm will earn above average 
profits. Unanticipated changes in demand and cost or 
high risk industries may lead to above average profits 
in competitive industries and result in differential 
returns both within and between high and low concentra¬ 
tion industries. . . . Hence, above average returns 
may persist in competitive industries for long periods 
of time given sufficient disequilibrium, or a monopoly 
may experience below average profits for long periods 
depending on demand and cost conditions. 
Pure competition is, of course, an extreme or limiting 
case. A study relating economic concepts to basic social 
processes explains: 
"Monopolistic competition" can be read simply as 
impure competition - that is, competition that fails to 
correspond in every detail with the hypothetical ideal 
of the theory of pure competition. Thus conceived, it 
[monopolistic competition] is the competition of any 
real-world economy.17 
^Stigler, Capital and Rates of Return, p. 55* 
•^Stanley i. Ornstein, "Concentration and Profits," 
Journal of Business (October, 1972), pp. 519-520. 
"^Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblora, Politics, 
Economics and Welfare (New York: Harper and Row"] 1953) • 
p. £01. 
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Inter-Industry Comparisons 
When inter-industry ROI comparisons are made, industries 
are grouped by their stage in the productive cycle (e.g., 
manufacturing or retailing) or by the nature of the product 
(e.g,, consumer or producer good) or by some other variable. 
This is done on the assumption that these industry groups 
hold constant such characteristics as risk, growth rate in 
demand, elasticity of demand, or other variables that can 
affect ROI. A comparison of rates of return for small 
grocery stores and for large banks, for instance, would be 
meaningless because the two groups are too dissimilar. 
Therefore, ROI comparisons are made within broad industry 
groups; e.g., comparing a manufacturing industry with an 
all-manufacturing industries average. 
The use of industry groups assumes that all the in¬ 
dustries in a group have similar characteristics. This 
assumption is difficult to accept as the industries in a 
modern technological economy have diverse investment and 
structural characteristics. 
The assumption of similar investment and structural 
characteristics can be avoided by using a model that ex¬ 
plicitly considers these rate of return determinants. 
Industry structure can be held constant by using the well- 
known market models. ° However, these structural models 
1 ft 
The four basic models are pure competition, monop¬ 
olistic competition, oligopoly, and pure monopoly. 
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do not solve the problem of comparability for several 
reasons. First, there are only four main categories for 
industry structure. This dictates that all but the most 
obvious differences between industries must be ignored 
since an industry can be placed into only one of the basic 
models even though the industry may have characteristics 
19 
associated with several of the models. Second, the 
structural models make no allowance for investment charac¬ 
teristics which can affect rates of return. 
Inter-industry comparisons of return on investment 
have been complicated by several problems. First, there 
is no agreement regarding the proper definition of ROI to 
utilize for such comparisons. Second, some economists 
have interpreted the propositions of competitive theory 
in such a manner as to equate relatively high rates of 
return with anti-competitive behavior. Third, the basic 
market models have been used to hold structural charac¬ 
teristics constant but these models ignore fine differences 
in characteristics since there are only four basic models. 
Also, structural models do not allow consideration of 
investment characteristics. What is needed is a model of 
ROI which explicitly considers the determinants of ROI as 
19 
7For example, an industry may have a large number of 
small firms, a characteristic of monopolistic competition, 
but a few of the largest firms may dominate the market as 
in oligopoly. 
2k 
measured by both investment and structural characteristics. 
An alternative means of making inter-industry com¬ 
parisons of return is to use the investment and structural 
characteristics in a multiple regression model. For example, 
an equation with ROI as the dependent variable and risk as 
an independent variable would allow comparisons of rates of 
return with risk held constant. Other investment and struc¬ 
tural characteristics can be explicitly considered in the 
same equation. 
A multiple regression model of ROI that explicitly 
considers investment and structural characteristics is 
presented in Chapter V. Prior to that, the characteristics 
including risk and growth in addition to concentration, 
research intensity, company size, and advertising intensity 
are discussed in the next two chapters. 
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CHAPTER III 
INVESTMENT CHARACTERISTICS 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the literature 
pertaining to the influence of selected investment charac¬ 
teristics on ROI in order to provide a foundation for con¬ 
struction of a return on investment model. Primary emphasis 
is placed on risk and growth in demand inasmuch as these 
variables are associated with premium rates of return, even 
in competitive industries. The discussion of the influence 
of institutional or structural characteristics on ROI is 
deferred to Chapter IV.^ 
Risk Premium 
The association of risk and rate of return is widely 
accepted but poorly understood because the definition and 
measurement of risk are ambiguous. Verification of the 
risk/return relationship is difficult since risk is a sub¬ 
jective consideration, and consequently, researchers have 
had to use surrogate variables to measure risk. The one 
common element in the perception of risk is lack of pre¬ 
dictability regarding the return to be expected from an 
^The precise definitions for the variables used in 
the ROI model are explained in Chapter V. 
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Investment, and therefore, risk is defined as variability 
p 
of return on investment. 
/ 
In the money markets risk and return are considered 
together, and certainly, this is one reason why common stocks 
3 
are expected to have a higher yield than bonds. Bonds are 
generally less risky than stocks because bonds receive in¬ 
terest before dividends are paid, and in liquidation debt 
capital is returned first. Walter Hickman examined the 
risk/return relationship as it affects the securities markets 
and confirmed the traditional assumption of a positive asso¬ 
ciation between risk and rate of return.^ 
To lessen the complexity of the risk/return relation¬ 
ship, researchers commonly utilize several simplifying 
assumptions. The first concerns the difficulty of observing 
investors’ perceived expectations after the fact. Given a 
sufficient number of observations, it is assumed that the 
observed results are, on the average, the same as the results 
expected by the investors. Therefore, researchers use 
p 
No distinction is made in this study between risk and 
uncertainty. 
-^Mean rate of return from stocks was found to be sub¬ 
stantially higher than average return from bonds in Lawrence 
Fisher and Roman L. Weil, "Coping with the Risk of Interest- 
Rate Fluctuations,” Journal of Business (October, 1971)> 
pp. ij.08-431. 
4 
Walter B. Hickman, Corporate Bond Quality and Investor 
Experience (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19^5). 
£ 
■^This assumption is explained in detail in Paul H. 
Cootner and Daniel M. Holland, "Risk and Rate of Return," 
(Cambridge, Ma.: MIT DST Project #95&5> 1964). (Mimeo¬ 
graphed.) 
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ex post information to assess ex ante risk. 
A second simplifying assumption is that investors have 
6 
diminishing marginal utility for income or wealth. Since 
diminishing marginal utility implies risk aversion, an 
investor is assumed to accept additional risk only if it is 
coupled with increased return and if the return is increased 
in more than a one-to-one ratio with risk. In other words, 
the investor values the dollar of investment which he stands 
7 
to lose more than the dollar of return he hopes to gain.' 
Variability of return as a measure of risk. It is 
generally accepted that there is a positive association be¬ 
tween rate of return and uncertainty about the receipt of 
return, but an acceptable means of measuring the risk 
premium has been elusive. Explaining their procedure in 
the development of a risk measure, Paul Cootner and Daniel 
Holland state: 
Risk is basically a subjective phenomenon, and not 
susceptible to direct measurement. What we have done 
therefore, is by purely deductive reasoning estab¬ 
lished that certain other, objectively measurable 
concepts are related to risk. Our next step is, by 
For an extensive discussion of the subject of utility 
of income, see Milton Friedman and Leonard Savage, ’’The 
Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk,” Journal of 
Political Economy (August, 1948), pp. 279-304* 
7 
Two references that discuss investor risk aversion 
are Richard A. Brealey, An Introduction to Risk and Return 
from Common Stocks (Cambridge, Ma.: MIT Press, 1969), 
pp. 47“£4; and Paul H. Cootner and Daniel M. Holland, "Rate 
of Return and Business Risk,” The Bell Journal of Economics 
and Management Science (Autumn, 197^)* pp. 2ll-226. 
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statistical techniques, to correlate rate of return 
with these objective measures.” 
They utilized the standard deviation of individual company 
ROI’s around the industry mean for the measurement of 
variability of return (risk).^ Regression analysis pro¬ 
duced a statistically significant positive association 
between rate of return and the standard deviation and thus 
confirmed the hypothesis that dispersion of company ROI is 
a determinant of return on investment. 
The relationship between return on investment and 
variability of return is depicted by the two hypothetical 
distributions of ROI in Figure 1. Measured by the variance 
or standard deviation, dispersion of company rates of re¬ 
turn for industry A is relatively small, while for industry 
B, dispersion is much larger. Similarly, uncertainty re¬ 
garding occurrence of a given rate of return is much greater 
for industry B than for A. For B the risk of a negative 
rate of return is very real possibility, but for A, the 
risk of such a capital loss is negligible. A risk-averse 
investor would demand a higher rate of return from an invest¬ 
ment in industry B because of the greater uncertainty 
o 
°Cootner and Holland, "Risk and Rate of Return," p. 31. 
^For a discussion of various descriptive measures of 
the probability distribution of rates of return, see 
Appendix I. There has been much research into the question 
of the total risk associated with a portfolio of investments 
as opposed to the risk associated with the investments them¬ 
selves. Such studies are commonly referred to as covariance 
models• 
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associated with this investment. 
There are two separate methods for measuring variability 
of return: inter-spatial variation and inter-temporal varia¬ 
tion. Inter-spatial variation is found by calculating varia¬ 
bility of individual company rates of return around their 
industry mean. Inter-temporal variation is the variability 
of company rate of return around its own mean over time. 
The inter-temporal method is a measure of the volatility 
of an individual company’s ROI. Stated alternatively, the 
inter-temporal measure indicates the extent to which company 
rate of return is affected by cyclical changes in the economy. 
To the extent that cyclical changes can be predicted, temporal 
variation in ROI can be predicted. If a firm’s future rate 
of return can be predicted with any reasonable degree of 
accuracy, the fact that the predictions vary considerably 
over time does not mean that investment in the firm is un¬ 
certain or risky. Reliance on inter-temporal variability 
can be criticized also on the basis that economic time series 
tend to be autocorrelated, and therefore, the measure is 
unsatisfactory as a risk measure.^ 
Inter-spatial variability of return measures the 
volatility of individual company rates around the average 
■^This problem is emphasized in U.S., Congress, Senate, 
Subcommittee on Monopoly, Competitive Problems in the Drug 
Industry, statement submitted by Gordon R. Conrad and Irving 
ti. ploikin (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1968), pp. 1714-6-17814.. 
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for the industry, and is, therefore, an industry rather 
than a company measure.^ Differences in inter-spatial 
variability between industries could result from such sources 
as: 
1. Differences in the ease of entry into an industry 
or ease of adding to productive capacity. 
2. Differences in income elasticity of demand for 
the industry’s output which would affect response to general 
economic activity. 
3. Differences in price flexibility. 
!(.. Differences in raw material supply stability. 
5. Differences in storability and durability of raw 
materials and finished goods. 
6. Differences in exposure to foreign competition. 
7. Differences in competition among existing products. 
Ihe unique set of these and other characteristics defines 
the risk environment for an industry. 
The following characterization of how the investor 
may perceive risk demonstrates inter-spatial variability 
of return as a risk measure: A capital supplier can invest 
in an industry by either setting up a new firm or by pro¬ 
viding capital to a going concern for asset expansion, 
product development, or other projects. Being reasonably 
^This conceptualization closely follows that in 
Conrad and Plotkin’s testimony. 
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experienced, the investor assumes he can pick investments 
as well as anyone else which implies he at times will be 
particularly astute and at times will make errors. The 
investor might well judge the risk inherent in investing 
in the industry by the past impact upon ROI of errors and 
astute decisions experienced by firms in the industry. If 
the impact on ROI has been extreme as evidenced by high 
inter-spatial dispersion, risk would be judged high. If 
it appeared unlikely that a decision-making error would 
push ROI far from the industry mean, risk would be assumed 
negligible. 
Concluding that inter-spatial variation is superior 
to the inter-temporal measure, Conrad and Plotkin summarized 
their rationale as follows: 
Researchers who have concentrated on temporal 
measures of riskiness have generally found them 
unsatisfactory both theoretically and empirically. 
The inability of these measures to ’’explain" rates 
of return we attributed to the fact that they con¬ 
founded predictable with nonpredictable changes. 
It is our feeling that the interspatial risk measure 
better captures the all-important nonpredictable 
element.32 
Inter-spatial variability is, therefore, a summary 
measure that indicates the risk environment of an industry. 
In order to attract capital, a firm in a high-risk environ¬ 
ment must offer a compensatory high rate of return relative 
1P 
Gordon R. Conrad and Irving H. Plotkin, "Risk/ 
Return: U.S. Industry Pattern," Harvard Business Review 
(March-April, 1968), Supplement. 
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to that available from firms in lower-risk environments. 
The measure, of course, is applicable to investments in 
individual companies and not to balanced portfolios con¬ 
taining investments in many firms from a given industry. 
Hie inter-spatial measure can, however, indicate high 
risk even though there is considerable stability in in¬ 
dividual company rates of return. This would be the case, 
for example, if some firms in an industry have consistently 
high rates of return while others have consistently low 
rates. For the measure to be valid, then, both individual 
company rates of return and relative company rankings must 
vary over time.^ 
Researchers have utilized both the inter-temporal 
and the inter-spatial measures of risk. For example, 
Cootner and Holland included both measures as variables in 
a multiple regression equation and found the two risk 
variables to be highly collinear.^ Their preference for 
the inter-spatial measure was based on the assumption that 
investors find it costly to diversify within, as opposed to 
between, industries, and therefore, rates of return for in¬ 
dustries with particularly high inter-spatial variation must 
include a risk premium as compensation for such costs. 
^3gy studying temporal variation of ROI along with 
rank-order correlation coefficients, Conrad and Plotkin con¬ 
cluded that both individual company returns and relative 
rank do vary over time. See Conrad and Plotkin, "Risk/ 
Re turn." 
■^Cootner and Holland, "Rate of Return and Business Risk." 
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Inter-temporal as well as inter-spatial variation 
were used in a study by Fisher and Ha 11.Although both 
measures were statistically significant explanatory vari¬ 
ables for ROI, the authors adopted the temporal variable 
on logical grounds. Their basic argument was that temporal 
variation reflects risk in general terms as the uncertainty 
of predicting a company’s future rate of return. However, 
as pointed out above, variation over time may be relatively 
predictable and therefore not at all uncertain. 
In the Conrad and Plotkin study cited above, the 
arguments regarding the proper measure for use in inter¬ 
industry risk/return comparisons were reviewed.1^ When 
they statistically tested the inter-spatial and inter¬ 
temporal measures, the former was found to have a signif¬ 
icant positive association with ROI, while the latter was 
significant but had a negative coefficient which was con¬ 
trary to their hypothesis. 
Inasmuch as the goal in this study is to develop a 
measure that adequately reflects subjective investment risk 
for use in inter-industry comparisons of rate of return, it 
does appear from the review of the literature that the better 
^1. N. Fisher and G. R. Hall, "Risk and Corporate 
Rates of Return,” Quarterly Journal of Economics (February, 
1969), pp. 79-92. 
■^Conrad and Plotkin, ’’Risk/Return." 
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choice is inter-spatial variation. The rationale is much 
like the one put forward by Conrad and Plotkin. First, the 
/ 
inter-spatial measure seems to reflect better the non- 
predictable element of investment which is presumably central 
to investors’ perceptions of risk. In contrast, the inter¬ 
temporal measure appears to reflect the extent to which 
cyclical change affects a particular firm. The state of the 
art in forecasting cyclical change provides a basis for 
predicting the future movement of company ROI around its 
17 own mean. 
Second, inter-spatial variation is a true industry 
variable rather than an average of company variables. Al¬ 
though investments are made in companies, it is argued that 
industry statistics strongly influence choice of investment. 
The assumption is that investors have limited time and re¬ 
sources for acquiring investment information, and conse¬ 
quently, they rely heavily on industry statistics. 
The Conrad and Plotkin study referred to earlier is 
an example of the use of inter-spatial dispersion to explain 
industry rate of return. Using data for 1950-1965 from the 
Compustat Tape, the authors tested the hypothesis ”... 
that industries characterized by highly dispersed profit 
■^The investor has considerable choice among the variety 
of forecasting techniques and models; nevertheless, he is 
probably able to predict future business conditions for an 
industry more accurately than to predict individual company 
rates of return. 
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distributions are judged by management and investors to be 
riskier than those characterized by compact distributions 
1A 
of profit rates.” With ROI defined as average return 
after taxes on total permanent capitalization, the risk/ 
return association was positive and significant, and there¬ 
fore, the hypothesis was accepted. Some of Conrad and 
Plotkin’s results are shown in Table 3« It is interesting 
to note in this table that the drug industry has the highest 
variance and second highest ROI. 
In the course of Senate hearings on the drug industry, 
Conrad and Plotkin’s study was criticized by Willard Mueller. 
In his testimony, Mueller claimed: "The preponderance of 
economic evidence argues that the persistently high profits 
of the drug industry are the result of the absence of 
effective price competition in the sale of many products. 
He concluded that inter-spatial variation of ROI is actually 
a measure of relative market power: 
Because of advertising and other factors, some firms 
in such [differentiated product] industries have a 
pronounced and persistent advantage over others. As 
a result, the most advantaged firms earn persistently 
higher profits than the less advantaged firms. Such 
a difference between the profits of the most advantaged 
and least advantaged firms in an industry may provide 
^Conrad and Plotkin, ” Risk/Re turn. " 
^%.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Monopoly, 
Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry, statement sub¬ 
mitted by Willard F. Mueller (Washington, D.C.: Govern¬ 
ment Printing Office, 1968), p. 1827. 
37 
TABLE 3 
RETURN ON INVESTMENT AND VARIANCE 
1950-1965 
Industry Variance6 R0Ib 
Cosmetics 67.281*. 18.7 
Aerospace 59.901 12.2 
Radio and TV Manufacturers 57.631 15.0 
Bldg. Mat. - Heating, A/C, & Plumbing 34-965 8.8 
Electrical Products 27.I4.86 11.0 
Machinery Manufacturers 27.1*26 10.1 
Beverages - Brewers 25.1*12 9.8 
Electronic Products 22.822 13.0 
Chemicals and Chemical Products 21.306 12.1 
Shoe Manufacturers 20.535 8.7 
Machinery - Metal Fabricating 19.580 9.0 
Copper Producers 19.528 9.5 
Office and Business Equipment 14.170 12.5 
Building Materials - Cement 8.708 11.7 
Textiles 8.477 7.5 
Oil - Integrated Producers 7.494 10.6 
Steel Producers 5.014 8.5 
Containers - Metal and Glass 3.709 8.1 
Aluminum Producers ^•579 L*8 
All-Manufacturing Industries Average 23.8i^. 10.8 
Drugs - Ethical and Proprietary 74.213 17.5 
aVariance in percent squared units. 
^ROI (percent) - Average rate of return after taxes 
on total permanent capitalization (book value). 
Source: Gordon R. Conrad and Irving H. Plotkin, ”Risk/ 
Return: U.S. Industry Pattern,” Harvard Business 
Review (March-April, I960), p. 94- 
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a rough measure of the height of the entry barriers 
into the industry.20 
To back up his claims, Mueller presented a restructuring of 
Conrad and Plotkin’s industry sample by separating consumer 
and producer goods industries. As a result of the re¬ 
structuring, the risk/return relationship became very weak 
and not statistically significant for the producer goods 
industries which Mueller believes are more homogeneous. 
Hie strong positive association between variance and ROI 
remained for the consumer goods sample. 
Conrad and Plotkin consider this criticism in depth 
in an unpublished rebuttal to Mueller’s testimony.^2 
Regarding the claim that inter-spatial variation really 
reflects the height of barriers to entry, they argue that 
the measure has been successfully used in stock market 
2 3 
studies. The measure, in their opinion, cannot be inter¬ 
preted as measuring barriers to entry in the securities 
markets since all industries are equally easy to enter by 
PO 
Ibid., p. 1835. 
21 
As can be seen in Table 3* Conrad and Plotkin mix 
consumer and producer goods industries in their sample. 
PP 
Irving H. Plotkin and Gordon R. Conrad, ’’Rebuttal 
to Testimony Given by Dr. Willard F. Mueller, Director, 
Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, Before the 
Monopoly Subcommittee of the Select Committee on Small 
Business, United States Senate, Washington, D.C. - January 
18, 1968,” p. 2. (Typewritten.) 
^For example, see Brealey, An Introduction to Risk; 
and Lawrence Fisher and James H. Lorie, "Some Studies of* 
Variability of Return on Investments in Common Stocks,” 
Journal of Business (April, 1970), pp. 99-13I+. 
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the purchase of stocks and bonds. 
As to Mueller’s restructuring of the industries to 
provide a more homogeneous sample, Conrad and Plotkin say: 
... it is not necessary that all industries in any 
regression service the same sector of the economy - 
for example, producer goods or consumer goods. Nor 
is it necessary that all industries in the regression 
be purely competitive industries. Nor is there any 
basis for requiring product homogeneity within the 
industries. The only homogeneity requirement is that 
they represent realistic alternative possibilities 
for capital investment. . . . 
One of the objects of this study was to isolate 
evidence of non-competitive returns. It is, accord¬ 
ingly futile and without theoretical basis to require 
that all industries studied be purely competitive.^4 
Two further quotations help to characterize Conrad 
and Plotkin’s views. 
It was not our object to establish the drug 
industry as being uniquely risky, and we make no such 
claim. We merely make the claim that the capital 
allocation process in our economy is one which demands 
higher prospective rates of return for projects which 
it considers more risky. 
. • . The condemnations implicit in listing 
industrial endeavors from highest to lowest profit 
without regard for risk variations are without 
economic justification.^5 
Stigler empirically studies the view, expressed by 
Mueller, that competitive industries will exhibit a smaller 
dispersion of average rates of return than noncompetitive 
industries For the time period 1938-194.7* he finds that 
“^Plotkin and Conrad, ’’Rebuttal to Mueller,” p. 11. 
25lbld.. pp. 17-18. 
26 
George J. Stigler, Capital and Rates of Return in 
Manufacturing Industries (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1963), pp. 69-70. 
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the variance of concentrated industries is significantly 
greater than that for unconcentrated industries, but using 
a second period, 1947“1954» there is no significant dif¬ 
ference between the two variances. These ambiguous results 
are further confused by the fact that the concentrated and 
unconcentrated samples exhibit no significant differences 
in rates of return. The results do not confirm the hypo¬ 
thesis that concentrated industries have greater dispersion 
in ROI. 
A major study commissioned by the Bank Administration 
Institute deals in depth with the problem of risk measure¬ 
ment. In brief, the study concludes: 
Almost every writer, however, believes that risk is 
associated with uncertainty or unpredictability. 
Therefore, when talking about the riskiness of 
securities or other assets, it seems reasonable to 
assert that their riskiness is related to uncertainty 
regarding their rates of return in the future. In 
addition, it seems reasonable to believe that ex ante 
uncertainty is related to ex post variability "In rates 
of return. For those reasons, most studies of the 
relationship between risk and rate of return are 
studies of the relationship between some measure of 
variability in rates of return and average rates of 
return .27 
Another risk/return study emphasizes the problem of 
^Bank Administration Institute, Measuring the 
Investment Performance of Pension Funds fPark Ridge, Ill.: 
The Institute, 1968), p. 29. 
p ft 
management's discretion in accounting treatment. The 
authors, Robert Litzenberger and Cherukuri Rao, discuss the 
possibility that some firms can lessen the magnitude of 
unanticipated swings in earnings by smoothing reported 
income.^ The study found a statistically significant 
association between variation of return and ROI. 
There have been a number of studies critical of the 
use of variation in return to measure risk. For example, 
the Mueller testimony discussed above is notable.3® Another 
case in point is a study by Jon Joyce and Robert Vogel who 
demonstrate empirically that variance under some conditions 
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produces conflicting rankings as regards risk. None of 
these critical studies has been sufficiently persuasive 
or conclusive to eliminate variation of return as the most 
widely used measure for risk. 
Skewness as a measure of risk. There is considerable 
evidence to suggest the inclusion of higher order moments 
than mean and variance in describing distributions of ROI. 
2®Robert H. Litzenberger and Cherukuri U. Rao, "Esti¬ 
mates of the Marginal Rate of Time Preference and Average 
Risk Aversion of Investors in Electric Utility Shares, 1960- 
1966," The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 
(Spring, 1971), pp. 265-277. 
2 Q 
7For a discussion of this topic, see Richard H. Simpson 
"An Empirical Study of Possible Income Manipulation," ^count¬ 
ing Review (October, 1969), pp. 806-817. 
3^U.S., Congress, Senate, Competitive Problems in the 
Drug Industry, pp. 1807-1961. 
Jon Joyce and Robert Vogely "The Uncertainty in Risk: 
Is Variance Unambiguous?" Journal of Finance (March, 1970), 
pp. 127-1314.. 
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Use of the mean-variance approach depends on at least one 
of the following conditions being met: 1) that the dis¬ 
tribution of ROI can be adequately described by a two- 
parameter family distribution such as the normal or 
Gaussian; or 2) that investors consider only mean and 
12 
variance in making decisions under certainty.^- Not¬ 
withstanding the widespread use of the mean-variance 
framework, there have been a number of studies which 
demonstrate both conceptually and empirically the 
implausibility of these conditions.33 Therefore, it seems 
reasonable to examine the measure of the third moment, 
skewness, as a possible determinant of rate of return. To 
reduce the complexity of the discussion, it is assumed in 
this section that variance is held constant, or in other 
words, skewness is considered as a variable for a given 
degree of variance. 
The concept of skewness is depicted in Figure 2 which 
shows three hypothetical distributions, each with the same 
mean, but different skewness. The first is a symmetrical 
distribution showing the same frequency of occurrence of 
3^For a discussion of the distribution of ROI, see 
James Tobin, "Liquidity Preference as Behavior Towards Risk," 
Review of Economic Studies (February, 1958)> pp. 65-86. 
33 
For example, see Kenneth J. Arrow, Essays in the 
Theory of Risk-Bearing (Chicago: Markham, 1971)> and S. C. 
Tsiang^ ,rlhe Rationale of the Mean-Standard Deviation 
Analysis, Skewness Preference, and the Demand for Money," 
American Economic Review (June, 1972), pp. 354*371. 
Frequency 
of 
Occurrenee 
Fig. 2.--Symmetrical and skewed distributions 
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rates of return above the mean as below the mean. The 
second distribution is positively skewed with a high fre¬ 
quency of occurrence of rates of return below the mean 
and a low frequency of rates above the mean. Very high 
rates of return do occur but relatively infrequently. 
The third graph shows negative skewness where rates of 
return above the mean occur with high frequency and rates 
below with low frequency. As shown in graph C, the prob¬ 
ability of a large negative rate of return (a capital loss) 
is considerably greater in the negatively skewed distribu¬ 
tion . 
The commonly hypothesized negative relationship be¬ 
tween ROI and skewness results from emphasizing the small 
chances of a large capital loss or a high rate of return 
as depicted by the tails of the skewed distributions. 
Researchers have posited that risk-averse investors demand 
a risk premium to offset the small chance of a large capital 
loss and that investors will accept lower average rates of 
return in order to gain the small chance of a relatively 
high ROI. Such behavior is often described as resulting 
from a lottery effect whereby the investor prefers positive 
asymmetric distributions (like a lottery) and dislikes 
negatively skewed distributions.-^ 
^"Lotteries and insurance are discussed in Friedman 
and Savage, ’’The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving 
Risk.” 
In a frequently cited article regarding the effects 
of asymmetric distributions, Fred Arditti hypothesized a 
negative association between ROI and skewness. ^ He 
tested skewness as a determinant of ROI in a simple regres¬ 
sion model using data for firms listed in Standard and 
Poor* 8 Composite Index for the period 1914-6-1963. Although 
the regression coefficient for skewness was significant, 
its sign was positive, not negative as predicted. When 
skewness was included in a multiple regression with 
variance and other independent variables, the skewness 
variable was significant and had the hypothesized negative 
sign. 
To study skewness as a determinant of ROI, Jeffrey 
Jarrett added a skewness variable to a previously developed 
model which related rate of return to the coefficient of 
variation. While he did not perform any statistical 
35pred D. Arditti, ’’Risk and the Required Return on 
Equity,” Journal of Finance (March, 1967), pp. 19-36. 
When discussing the sign o;f the skewness/ROI relationship, 
there is a potential for confusion. Preference for positive 
skewness and dislike of negative skewness implies that in¬ 
vestors expect a higher ROI in compensation for accepting 
negative skewness and that investors will accept a lower 
ROI in exchange for positive skewness. Therefore, a negative 
association between ROI and skewness is predicted. 
^ Jeffrey Jarrett, ”A Note on Earnings Risk and the 
Coefficient of Variation: Comment,” Journal of Finance 
(December, 1970), pp. 1159-1160. The original model is 
from Richard P. Brief and Joel Owen, "A Note on Earnings 
Risk and the Coefficient of Variation,” Journal of Finance 
(December, 1969), pp. 901-9014.. 
1+6 
tests on the added variable, Jarrett did show that when 
skewness is included, quite different predicted rates of 
return result. 
Skewness was included as a variable in the Fisher and 
17 
Hall study discussed above. The authors hypothesized that 
skewness would have a negative sign implying negative skew- 
r 
ness is associated with high rates of return. However, in 
a footnote which demonstrates the relationship in equation 
form, they explained that it is unclear whether the co¬ 
efficient of the skewness variable is positive or negative. 
Their empirical results showed the coefficient of skewness 
to be negative but significant only at the 10 percent level. 
Although not offering any rationale, Cootner and 
Holland implicitly accept the negative association between 
ROI and skewness.In their multiple regression model 
which includes other risk measures, the coefficient of 
skewness was significant at the 1 percent level, but its 
sign was positive. The authors explain that this result 
may indicate no relation exists between ROI and skewness, 
but they also acknowledge the possibility of a conceptual 
error in the specification of the skewness variable. 
Using an entirely different line of approach, Clayton 
37pisher and Hall, "Risk and Corporate Rates of 
Return." 
3®Cootner and Holland, "Rate of Return and Business 
n Risk. 
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Alderfer and Harold Bierraan conducted an experiment to teat 
the effects of skewness on the investor. For subjects, 
they used business school graduate students and company 
middle managers who were asked to choose between investments 
with similar means and variances but different skewness. 
Itie graduate students showed a strong preference for invest¬ 
ments with high positive skewness but no chance of loss 
and completely avoided an investment with high negative 
skewness and some chance of a large loss. The business 
managers also showed a preference for the positively skewed 
investment; however, II4. percent of the sample of managers 
did choose the investment with high negative skewness and 
some chance of a large loss. The different behavior by 
the two groups may be explainable by a higher degree of 
risk-aversion on the part of the students. These results 
lend some support to the negative ROI/skewness hypothesis, 
but no firm conclusion is possible, because skewness, even 
coupled with variance, was insufficient to explain the 
choices made. 
Understanding of the effects of skewness on rate of 
return has been considerably advanced by several recent 
studies which developed and tested three-moment capital 
39dayton Alderfer and Harold Bierman, Jr., "Choices 
with Risk; Beyond the Mean and Variance,” Journal of Busi¬ 
ness (July, 1970)» pp. 341-353* 
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asset pricing models.^ In an unpublished article, Alan 
Kraus and Robert Litzenberger derived such a three-parameter 
model by incorporating a measure of systematic (nondiversi- 
fiable) skewness into the mean-variance framework.^1 To 
justify their hypothesis of a negative association between 
skewness and rate of return, the authors emphasized the 
argument that investors have non-increasing absolute risk- 
aversion (i.e., risk assets are not inferior goods) which 
implies preference for positive skewness.^ Using securities 
market data, Kraus and Litzenberger tested the effects of 
skewness on ROI and found the risk variable to be significant 
and to have the expected sign. 
The assumption regarding non-increasing absolute risk- 
aversion was tested experimentally by Gordon, Paradis, and 
i;3 
Rorke. In a portfolio game, participants with different 
^These are basically portfolio models, and therefore, 
the variable definitions and data are somewhat different 
from those used in this study. However, the basic assumptions 
regarding the risk/return relationship are comparable. 
^Alan Kraus and Robert H. Litzenberger, "Skewness 
Preference and the Valuation of Risk Assets," December, 1972. 
(Mimeographed.) 
^The sign of the skewness variable is discussed in 
Arrow, Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing; Arditti, "Risk 
and the Required Return on EquityM; and S. C. Tsiang, "The 
Rationale of the Mean-Standard Deviation Analysis." 
^3m. j. Gordon, G. E. Paradis, and C. H. Rorke, 
"Etxperimental Evidence on Alternative Portfolio Decision 
Rules," American Economic Review (March, 1972), pp. 107- 
118. 
wealth levels made consumption and investment decisions. 
The decision-makers' behavior was compatible with the con¬ 
dition of decreasing absolute risk-aversion. 
Another three-parameter model has been formulated by 
Blaine Huntsman who predicted a negative association between 
ROI and skewness based on the "... normative and empir¬ 
ically appealing condition of decreasing absolute risk 
aversion. . . . To test the model, Huntsman used finan¬ 
cial and share price data stratified into four industry 
groups: electrical utilities, machinery, chemicals, and 
building materials. Skewness was found to be not statis¬ 
tically significant; however, this result can be explained 
on the basis of high correlation between the skewness and 
variance measures. 
Despite the continued use of the two-moment, mean- 
variance framework, there is considerable theoretical and 
empirical evidence that skewness has an important effect 
on rate of return. Taken as a whole, the research reviewed 
above provides strong support for the hypothesis of a 
negative association between skewness and ROI. 
Other measures of risk. There has been some research 
utilizing other ways of measuring risk. One measure, which 
deals with securities market prices, is based on the 
^■Blaine Huntsman, "Natural Behavior Toward Risk and 
the Question of Value Determination," Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative Analysis (March, 1973)> P• 33&• 
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assumption that investors reveal their subjective assessment 
of risk by their willingness to invest in a company at a 
given earnings-price ratio. An empirical study by Ferry 
Allen relates company earnings-price ratios to rates of 
return on investment in common stock and finds no apparent 
relationship between ROI and business risk as measured by 
U-5 
the earnings-price ratio. 
Another risk measure deals with asset turnover, an 
activity ratio. Robert Mayer explains the rationale: 
Generally speaking, the larger the proportion of fixed 
assets - whose value is extracted by the firm's opera¬ 
tion only over a long period of years - the less the 
activity of the total. Any factor, internal or ex¬ 
ternal, giving rise to expectation of an increase in 
the proportion of fixed assets thus tends to reduce 
the firm's prospective business productivity, i.e., to 
increase the business risk.W> 
However, Mayer offers no empirical research to support his 
ideas. 
Asset turnover as a risk measure is empirically tested 
by Alexander Barges. He correlates the total industry sales 
to total industry assets ratio with industry profit margins 
which provides an indirect comparison between risk and rate 
of return. The author concludes that "... the realized 
rates of return were higher for the low-turnover, high-risk 
^Ferry B. Allen, "The Measurement of Risk," Financial 
Analysts Journal (March-April, I960), pp. 63-70. 
^Robert W. Mayer, "Analysis of Internal Risk in the 
Individual Firm," Hie Analysts Journal (November, 1959), 
p. 92. 
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industries than for the high-turnover, low-risk industries. 
This association was, however, not statistically significant. 
Empirical work to date does not provide the foundation neces¬ 
sary to warrant the inclusion of asset turnover as a measure 
of risk in this study. 
Conclusion. It is generally accepted that capital sup¬ 
pliers expect to be compensated both for the time value of 
money they invest and for the risk inherent in a particular 
project. A major problem in utilizing the idea of additional 
return to compensate for risk has been the measurement of the 
risk premium. Different measures have been suggested such as 
historical variation of return, skewness of the distribution 
of ROI, price-earnings ratio, and asset turnover.^® Each of 
these measures has one or more shortcomings, and no researcher 
has claimed that any one of them accurately measures subjec¬ 
tive risk. Logical reasoning coupled with the empirical 
studies outlined above lead to the conclusion that the best 
available measures of risk for use in inter-indsutry com¬ 
parisons of ROI are inter-spatial variance and skewness of 
return on investment. 
^Alexander Barges, "Forecasting Returns from Indus¬ 
trial Investments," in Readings in Financial Management, 
ed. by Raymond G. SchulTz (2ded .; Scranton, Pa.: Inter- 
national, 1970), p. 70. 
^See Appendix I for a discussion of such other 
measures of risk as semi-variance and standard deviation. 
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Growth in Demand 
Growth is often cited as being closely related to rate 
of return, but there is disagreement regarding the definition 
and measurement of the variable. This has led to confusion 
regarding the effects of growth on ROI regardless of how it 
is defined. Growth has come to symbolize success and 
efficiency in business management, and therefore, growth 
is linked with the higher rates of return associated with 
successful firms. The relation between growth, be it of 
assets or sales or another measure, and ROI can be empiri¬ 
cally verified. However, such empirical work requires some 
framework for explaining the association. 
That so little agreed upon theory about growth has 
been developed seems especially surprising in light of the 
importance growth apparently has for most businessmen. 
Listening to businessmen talk and reading the financial 
press, one would almost believe that growth is the central 
goal of most companies. William Baumol says, "I believe 
that to him [the businessman] sales have become an end in 
ii.9 
and of themselves."^ 
An important difficulty in developing ideas pertaining 
to growth is that the concept means different things to dif¬ 
ferent people. In its current usage, the term may apply to 
^William J. Baumol, Business Behavior, Value and 
Growth (New York: Macmillan, 1959), p. I4.6. 
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growth in earnings, growth of stock prices, growth in sales, 
expansion of assets, and increases in other measures of 
corporate dimensions. 
Those who view growth as a type of risk usually 
emphasize rate of change in some measure of assets. 
Adherents of this concept state that growth, 
. . . increases the firm’s profit opportunities, but 
also places it [the firm] in a more risky position. 
In general, the higher the rate of real investment per 
period . . ., the more vulnerable are firms to un¬ 
favorable contingencies.^ 
Baumol links growth and risk, saying, ”... growth is what 
strains the firm’s entrepreneurial resources and adds to 
the company’s risks. . . . n5l 
Viewing growth as a form of risk implies the hypo¬ 
thesis that growth and ROI are positively related. If 
growth is measured by rate of increase in assets, espe¬ 
cially fixed assets, the concept is much like the turnover 
measure of risk outlined above. Assuming the perception of 
risk mostly results from unpredictability of future returns, 
variability of ex post ROI is used as a measure of risk. 
Growth can contribute to this variability and therefore may 
be a determinant of risk. As a measure of risk, however. 
^ Charles R. Whittlesey, Arthur M. Freedman, and 
Edward S. Herman, Money and Banking: Analysis and Policy 
(2d ed.; New York: Macmillan, 196o), p. 320. 
^William J. Baumol, ’’Communication: On the Theory 
of Expansion of the Firm,” American Economic Review (Decem¬ 
ber, 1962), p. 1080. 
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variability of return is directly related to risk whereas 
growth is indirectly related through the variability measure. 
Another theoretical framework for studying growth is 
built on the concept of capital as a basic resource. Since 
production requires the combining of these factors, growth 
in demand is fulfilled by increasing the quantity of the 
factors used. The resulting increase in demand for pro¬ 
ductive resources leads to rising resource costs, in¬ 
cluding capital costs. Since demand for capital is derived 
from product demand, capital demand increases as product 
demand increases. Different industries, of course, face 
different rates of product demand increases and therefore 
have different rates of capital demand growth. 
The determinants of the rate of change in product 
demand and the determinants of the rate of growth in capital 
supply are for the most part independent, capital supply 
being a function of U.S. and international saving. This 
leads to differential growth rates for the two functions. 
Firms with rapidly growing product demand may find their 
needs for capital growing more rapidly than the increase in 
capital supply. In order to increase their share of avail¬ 
able capital, the rapidly growing firms will have to bid up 
the price of capital (ROI) to meet their needs. This leads 
to the expectation that growth in demand will be positively 
related to rate of return. 
An underlying assumption, of course, is that the 
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supply of capital is less than perfectly elastic. Eli 
Schwartz, who disagrees with this assumption, believes that 
the problem of corporate growth is not financial, that the 
cash throw-off of the corporate sector of the economy is 
more than enough to finance growth, and that the supply of 
52 
capital is relatively elastic. Baumol sees a different 
situation. Noting that the sources of capital will not 
ordinarily supply unlimited amounts of capital to any 
single firm, he believes a company is usually well aware 
51 
of an upper limit of available money capital. J It may be 
that capital is relatively elastic for corporations in 
general but not for individual firms or industries. 
Even if total capital supply is perfectly elastic, 
firms experiencing rapidly growing demand may find investors 
requiring a growth premium. If on the average, the capital 
requirements of firms in an industry are growing more 
rapidly than capital supply, their capital needs can be 
met only by an increase in the proportion of investors1 
portfolios allocated to the industry. This undesired in¬ 
crease in portfolio concentration may cause investors to 
expect additional compensation in the form of a growth 
premium. In an industry where some firms are growing while 
others face declining demand, investors can switch capital 
52e11 Schwartz, "Note on a Theory of Firm Growth," 
Journal of Business (January, 1965), pp. 29-33* 
^Baumol, Business Behavior, pp. 34-35* 
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from on© firm to another in the industry and thereby not 
disturb their portfolio balance. 
Some earlier studies have distinguished between 
growth in demand resulting from general economic expansion 
and growth created by the development of new products. 
Ezra Soloman sees growth, as opposed to only expansion, as 
resulting from the ability of the firm to find and exploit 
opportunities to invest in products and projects that will 
increase ROI.^ Peter Bernstein believes that, ’’The ability 
to create its own market is the strategic, the dominating 
and single most distinguishing characteristic of a true 
growth company.”^ 
While the distinction between growth and expansion 
may be appealing as a call for innovative managerial effort, 
it does not provide much insight into the relationship be¬ 
tween growth and rate of return. With present accounting 
data there is no way growth and expansion can be separated 
empirically, short of defining growth as increases in ROI. 
Expansion would then be reflected as increases in absolute 
size; e.g., assets; which are not accompanied by increases 
in rate of return. Defining growth in this way does nothing 
^Ezra Soloman, The Theory of Financial Management 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1^63). 
Peter L. Bernstein, "Growth Companies Vs. Growth 
Stocks," Harvard Business Review (September-October, 195&)> 
p. 89. 
to advance understanding of the determinants of ROI. 
As noted above, there is no generally accepted ana¬ 
lytical framework for the study of firm growth. Despite 
this lack of agreement, most authors posit a positive rela¬ 
tionship between growth in demand and rate of return. This 
is an empirically verifiable relationship. 
In a series of articles regarding the effects on ROI 
of differential growth rates, Barges distinguishes between 
growth and the concept of risk. The first study was 
primarily concerned with establishing a theory and empir¬ 
ically testing turnover as a measure of risk as discussed 
above, but the initial test of the turnover hypothesis was 
not as predicted. Recognizing the importance of demand 
in determining ROI and considering the dynamic nature of 
demand. Barges used multiple regression techniques to hold 
the dynamic demand variable (growth) constant. Adding this 
independent variable had the result of showing a positive 
association between turnover and ROI, but the equation was 
not statistically significant. In a summary the author 
says: 
The analysis of rates of return which was presented 
indicated that long-term growth in demand exerts a 
strong influence on the average rates of return realized 
by industries. This finding, of course, is not sur¬ 
prising, but it does serve to emphasize the point that 
growth rate must be given explicit consideration in any 
56 « 
^ Barges, 
Investments.” 
’’Forecasting Returns from Industrial 
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empirical analysis and in any realistic forecast of 
rates of re turn. 57 
In the second article, an attempt was made to fill the 
void of empirical research into the rate of return/rate of 
growth relationshipRegression analysis was utilized 
with average rate of return on assets as the dependent 
variable and average growth rate of demand as the indepen¬ 
dent variable. A positive association was found that was 
highly significant statistically. The author concludes 
that despite substantial variation in growth rate, growth 
in product demand is a significant factor in rate of return 
for firms and industries. 
The third article used the growth variable to explain 
C? Q 
a specific industry’s rate of return.^7 Following a review 
of the hypothesized effect of growth on capital supply, drug 
industry average rate of return was predicted using the 
average annual rate of change in demand. The article re¬ 
ports finding a growth premium of 3.9 percentage points over 
the average for a11-manufacturing industries of 12.9 percent. 
Taken together, these empirical studies provide considerable 
basis for acceptance of a positive association between growth 
57ibld.. p. 70. 
poAlexander Barges, "Growth Rates and Debt Capacity," 
Financial Analysts Journal (January-February, 1968), pp. 100- 
ToIT- 
Barges and Hickey, "Drug Industry Profits." 
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in demand and ROI. 
In a study emphasizing industry concentration, Ornstein 
included a growth in demand variable.^ Defining return on 
investment as net income after taxes divided by net worth, 
the author found a highly significant association between 
ROI and growth in demand. 
Another study, by William Leonard, attempted to 
ascertain the effects of growth and research activity on 
rate of return.^ When growth rate of sales was correlated 
with return (after taxes) on stockholders’ equity, a strong 
association resulted (r = .75)* 
Like most unresolved issues, the relationship between 
ROI and growth in demand is characterized by conflicting 
and contradictory ideas and empirical findings. One view 
outlined above places growth and risk in the same category 
in their roles as determinants of ROI. This aspect of 
growth would be expected to lead to uncertainty as to 
receipt of future financial returns and would therefore 
be captured in the variability of return measure of risk. 
Another idea, defining growth as only resulting from 
acceptance of projects giving a higher than average rate 
of return, does little to guide empirical research. For 
^Stanley I. Ornstein, "Concentration and Profits," 
Journal of Business (October, 1972), pp. 519-541. 
^William N. Leonard, "Research and Development in 
Industrial Growth," Journal of Political Economy (March- 
April, 1971), pp* 232-25&. 
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one thing, there is no way of distinguishing growth from 
expansion using available published financial data. A 
third concept of the association between ROI and growth 
assumes different growth rates for capital demand and 
capital supply. It is argued that investors expect a 
growth premium as compensation for increasing their port¬ 
folio concentration when supplying capital to rapidly 
growing firms in an industry. Although some of the under¬ 
lying assumptions about capital supply are debatable, this 
latter framework seems to be the most acceptable. 
Although the concept of growth is still being debated, 
the expectation of a positive relation between growth in 
demand and return on investment is generally accepted. 
This is an empirically verifiable hypothesis, and in fact, 
several studies have led to acceptance of this positive 
association. There is ample evidence to justify the in¬ 
clusion of a growth variable in the ROI model since to 
ignore growth would be to leave out a potentially useful 
explanatory concept. 
Summary 
In this chapter, two measures of risk as well as 
growth in demand have been discussed in their roles as 
investment characteristics that determine return on invest¬ 
ment. The basic argument is that industries characterized 
61 
by relatively high inter-spatial variance of ROI, positive 
skewness in the distribution of return, or relatively rapid 
growth in demand for the companies’ products, must offer 
compensatory rate of return premiums to attract capital. 
The next chapter discusses a set of industry structural 
characteristics which along with investment characteristics 
may affect rate of return on investment. 
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CHAPTER IV 
STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Industry structural characteristics are commonly used 
to explain above average rates of return.1 Market struc¬ 
ture analysis is used in recognition of the proposition that 
above average return on investment will attract new firms 
into a competitive industry with the ultimate effect of 
driving ROI down to the normal level. In other words, an 
above average rate of return should occur only for short 
periods in competitive industries. In noncompetitive theory 
firms are assumed to have some control over the market and 
consequently to have the potential of maintaining artifi¬ 
cially high rates of return. Many believe firms exercise 
this potential as a matter of course, but there is no 
agreement on whether firms do indeed behave in such a 
2 
manner. Equally, the mode of such firm behavior may not 
always be readily identifiable. 
^For a recent summary of the subject of industry 
structure as it relates to performance, see John M. Vernon, 
Market Structure and Industrial Performance (Boston, Allyn, 
to- 
2 
For a critical analysis of the extensive use of con¬ 
centration ratios as indications of monopoly power, see 
Yale Brozen, "Significance of Profit Data for Antitrust 
Policy," Antitrust Bulletin (Spring, 1969), pp. 119-139. 
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Because of the difficulties involved in attempting 
to measure differences in behavior, market structure 
analysis usually relates structural characteristics directly 
to rate of return. Joe Bain, who has done extensive market 
structure research, asserts that: 
. . . market conduct cannot be fully enough measured 
to permit us to establish empirically a meaningful 
association either between market conduct and per¬ 
formance, or between structure and market conduct. 
It thus becomes expedient to test directly for net 
association of market structure to market performance, 
leaving the detailed character of the implied linkage 
of conduct substantially unascertained.3 
Industry Concentration 
A widely used industry structural characteristic is 
the concentration ratio which measures the percent of an 
industry's economic activity accounted for by a specified 
number of its largest companies. With economic activity 
measured by sales, employment, value added, or assets, the 
higher the percent of total activity controlled by a small 
number of companies, the greater the assumed potential for 
maintaining above normal rates of return. 
The main source of data for determining concentration 
ratios is the Census Bureau, but these census data have 
3 Joe S. Bain, Industrial Organization (New York: 
Wiley, 1959), pp. 32i>-32?. 
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well-known deficiencies.^- In particular, the industry 
definitions often result in poorly delineated markets. For 
some industries the data are too broad to represent the 
relevant geographical or product market. For other in¬ 
dustries where there are close product substitutes, the 
data are too limited. Also, these national data are not 
representative of localized industries such as bakeries. 
Despite these problems, census data are widely used because 
of their availability and widespread familiarity. 
There have been a number of studies concerned with 
the relationship between industry HOI and the degree of 
concentration. One of the earliest was by Bain for the 
years 1936-19i|.0.^ Using return after taxes to equity and 
eight-firm concentration ratios, he did not find a close 
relationship between ROI and concentration. However, the 
industries with eight-firm concentration ratios above 
70 percent did tend to have high average rates of return. 
Recently Bain’s study was replicated by Yale Brozen 
using more recent data.^ Brozen’s research indicated that 
^U.S., Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufacturers, 
196J, Vol. 1, Summary and Subject Statistics (Washington, 
D.d. : Government Printing Office, 1971). Ill© limitations 
of concentration ratios are discussed in Jules Backman, 
Advertising and Competition (New York: NYU Press, 1967)* 
pp. • 
^Joe S. Bain, ’’Relation of Profit Rates to Industry 
Concentration,” Quarterly Journal of Economics (August, 
195D, PP- 293-32IT 
^Yale Brozen, ’’Bain’s Concentration and Rates of Re¬ 
turn Revisited,” Journal of Law and Economics (October, 
1971), PP. 351-3*S^ 
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Bain’s study may have been biased by inclusion of only large 
firms which tended to have high rates of return. If Bain’s 
industry sample was biased, the association he found between 
above average ROI and the concentrated group of industries 
is open to question. Brozen's results using more recent 
data failed to confirm Bain's conclusion that high rates of 
return result from concentration. 
A well-known study by George Stigler related concen- 
7 
tration to rate of return on total assets. By using various 
cut-off levels, he divided three-digit SIC industries into 
concentrated and unconcentrated groups. The hypothesis of 
a significant association between ROI and concentration ratio 
was not confirmed. However, partly because of the high 
level of aggregation (three-digit SIC level), his results 
were ambiguous.® 
Using a multiple regression model, Marshall Hall and 
Leonard Weiss related several variables, including the con¬ 
centration ratio, to two measures of ROI: income after 
9 
taxes to book equity and income after taxes to total assets. 
^George J. Stigler, Capital and Rates of Return in 
Manufacturing Industries (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1%3). 
D 
°For a discussion of the problems of using data that 
are aggregated above the four-digit SIC level, see Lester G. 
Telser, ’’Advertising and Competition,” Journal of Political 
Economy (December, 196if), pp. 537-5^2. 
^Marshall Hall and Leonard Weiss, ’’Firm Size and Prof¬ 
itability,” Review of Economics and Statistics (August, 
1967), pp. 319-331. 
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Concentration, measured by four-firm ratios, was a statis¬ 
tically significant determinant of ROI, but its influence 
on rate of return was less important than that of company 
size, a possible capital barrier to entry. 
Considering these ambiguous results from studies 
relating concentration ratios to ROI, the conclusion that 
concentration and performance are positively related can 
be only weakly accepted at best. Concentration ratios 
may be useful as substitute measures for company behavior 
which determines performance. The ratios, however, really 
measure only the potential for market control. As a con¬ 
sequence, additional information can be gained by studying 
the possible barriers to entry that are erected and main¬ 
tained by firms in a noncompetitive industry. Therefore, 
it seems prudent to couple the concentration variable with 
measures of possible barriers to entry such as the adver¬ 
tising to sales ratio, average company size, and research 
and development intensity. 
Research and Development Intensity 
As a determinant of ROI, research and development 
(R&D) can be considered in two ways: 1) R&D activity may 
or may not produce a marketable or patentable product, 
and therefore, such activity is uncertain as to return, 
or risky; 2) Past and present R&D expenditures produce 
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knowledge and techniques which give the existing firms in 
an industry an advantage over prospective entrants, and 
as a result, R&D outlays can be a barrier to entry. R&D 
intensity is a measure of the amount of research and develop¬ 
ment input in relation to output, with a commonly used 
figure being R&D expenditures as a percent of sales. 
Research and development can be an ambiguous concept. 
Here the term refers to those outlays for materials, facil¬ 
ities, and wages with the ultimate goal of producing new 
products or more efficient production techniques. R&D can 
be separated into basic research where there is no well- 
defined goal in terms of products or techniques, and 
development where a specific product or technique is being 
perfected into an economically feasible output. In report¬ 
ing financial data, companies lump development expense and 
outlays for basic research together as R&D expenditures.1^ 
Research and development activity is often associated 
with risky ventures because the return from R&D expenditures 
is uncertain. This is explained by one author who says that 
research is undersupported because of the uncertainty in¬ 
volved, ”... uncertainty as to income in general and as 
10Another problem is that for diversified companies 
R&D expenditures are not broken out by product area. For 
example, ethical drug companies’ R&D figures include out¬ 
lays for research related to non-drug products as well as 
for drug research. 
68 
to the ability of the sponsoring firm to exploit a specific 
discovery."H The authors of an article pertaining to the 
aerospace industry express a similar view: 
Concerning total risk, it is obvious that the greater 
the percentage of any firm’s business which involves 
research and development the higher the total risk. 
Production work is not as risky since past experience 
can be more easily applied as a yardstick to estimate 
future performance regarding quality, timing, and 
costs. 
This view leads to the conclusion that R&D outlays consti¬ 
tute a special type of risk, and therefore, R&D intensity 
and ROI should be positively related in the same manner as 
risk and ROI. 
When the uncertainty related to R&D outlays is con¬ 
sidered, the similar effects of expenditures on research 
and increasing production to fulfill growth in demand be¬ 
come apparent. These effects are not the same as general 
business risk, however, because management consciously sub¬ 
jects the firm’s future earnings to this uncertainty. Con¬ 
sequently, the degree of uncertainty can be controlled to 
some extent by limiting growth or research activity. 
A second way of relating R&D intensity and ROI 
utilizes the concept of market power. Extensive research 
^Daniel Hamberg, R&D Essays on the Economics of Re¬ 
search and Development (New York: Random, 19b6), p. £3. 
1p 
^Aerospace Research Center, Aerospace Profits Vs. 
Risks (Washington, D.C.: Aerospace Industries Association 
o^ America, 1971)# p. 2. 
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and development activity, especially coupled with the patent 
privilege, can create products and productive processes that 
cannot be duplicated or matched by other firms, particularly 
by prospective entrants into an industry. Thus, Rfid) outlays 
are a possible barrier to competitive entry. For example, 
Hugh Walker describes how this may be very important to 
ethical drug manufacturers: 
The principal sources of market power are the peculiar 
protection enjoyed by drug manufacturers because of 
the brand names used in the ethical drug industry and 
the provision of patent protection for the more 
recently introduced drugs. Brand names and patent 
protection permit firms to charge prices which are 
very much higher than the prices that would exist in 
the absence of market power.^3 
Some view the market power and economic rewards 
accruing from R&D activity as completely compatible with a 
competitive system. R&D expenditures are characterized as 
capital attracted by the potential for above average rates 
of return. It is argued that the market power given by 
patents was consciously created to generate just such re¬ 
search activity. For example, Jesse Markham states: 
The drug industry’s record of profits and 
expenditures for research and development suggests 
that the private interests of the individual drug 
firms and the public interest are served compatibly 
by the search for new and improved drugs. . . . 
Competition through vigorous inventive effort has 
also been highly profitable, keeping the ethical 
^Hugh D. Walker, Market Power and Price Levels in 
the Ethical Drug Industry (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1971), p. 3. 
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drug industry among the top three most profitable 
industries. • . .^h- 
There are, then, two views of the effects of R&D 
expenditures as a source of market power. One holds that 
this potential for some market control leads to socially 
desirable research, that firms compete to do this research 
in order to obtain the reward of a higher rate of return. 
The other sees patents and other aspects of market control 
arising from R&D activity as an undesirable means of holding 
rates of return above competitive levels. Both views pre¬ 
dict that relatively high R&D intensity will be associated 
with higher than average ROI. 
There has been only limited empirical research 
relating R&D intensity to ROI. Such research has been 
greatly hampered by the almost total lack of data for 
individual companies and limited industry data. The main 
data source, the National Science Foundation (NSF), pub¬ 
lishes industry R&D figures at the two- and three-digit 
SIC levels, but such highly aggregated figures are of only 
limited value for studying industry ROI.^ Also, the NSF 
reports are incomplete in that data for various years and 
^Jesse W. Markham, ’’Economic Incentives and Progress 
in the Drug Industry,” in Drugs in Our Society, ed. by Paul 
Talahay (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, l%i4.), pp. 175-176. 
■^U.S., National Science Foundation, Research and 
Development in Industry, 1970 (Washington, D.C.: Oovem- 
raent Printing Office, 1971)• 
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industries are missing. Only limited R&D information is 
obtainable from annual reports and such reference sources 
as Moody1 s Manuals.^ 
Of the few empirical studies, most find a significant, 
but weak, positive relationship between ROI and R&D in¬ 
tensity. The first of two such studies by William Leonard 
related growth rate of R&D intensity to growth rates of 
17 
sales, assets, and net income. R&D intensity was measured 
by research expenditures as a percent of sales and by the 
number of research scientists and engineers per 1000 
employees. Using a sample of sixteen manufacturing in¬ 
dustries, Leonard found a significant correlation between 
growth in R&D intensity and change in both sales and assets. 
However, the correlation with growth in net income after 
taxes was not significant, although it was positive as 
predicted. 
A second, unpublished, study by Leonard concerned 
the effects of market structure, especially R&D intensity 
T ft 
as a barrier to entry, on rates of return. ° The correla¬ 
tion between return after taxes on stockholders' investment 
^Moody's Industrial Manuals (New York: Moody's 
Investors Services, inc., 1963-1971)• 
■^William N. Leonard, "Research and Development in 
Industrial Growth," Journal of Political Economy (March- 
April, 1971), pp. 232-256. 
^William N. Leonard, "Significance to the Pharma¬ 
ceutical Industry of the Article 'R&D, Product Differen¬ 
tiation and Market Performance,'" Hempstead, N.Y., June 2, 
1971• (Typewritten.) 
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and R&D expenditures as a percent of sales was .80 for the 
period 1960-1969. 
In two studies, Edwin Mansfield found some support 
for a significant relation between ROI and R&D expenditures. 
One of his articles related research and development out¬ 
lays as a percent of sales to rates of return for industries 
where direct government financing is limited (e.g., chemicals, 
19 
petroleum, drugs, glass, and steel). Although his empirical 
results lend some support to the hypothesis of a positive 
R&D/ROI association, the results are hardly conclusive. 
There was little evidence to support the related hypothesis 
that larger companies spend a higher percentage of sales on 
R&D than do smaller firms. 
Instead of relating R&D intensity to ROI, Mansfield 
attempted to calculate the marginal rate of return from 
20 
R&D expenditures in his second study. Using a series of 
simplifying assumptions, he estimated very high marginal 
rates of return on R&D outlays for ten petroleum and chemical 
firms. For example, the petroleum sample's average rate 
was about I4.O to 60 percent a year for the period 1946-1962. 
19 
Edwin Mansfield, "Industrial Research and Develop¬ 
ment Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy (August, 
1961^), pp. 319-340. 
20 
Edwin Mansfield, "Rates of Return from Industrial 
Research and Development," Papers and Proceeding of the 
Seventy-Seventh Annual Meeting of the American Economic 
Association (dhlcago , 1964)» pp. 310-* 
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Although Mansfield’s results are not very precise and should 
be treated cautiously, they suggest that firms with high R&D 
21 
intensity should exhibit high rates of return on investment. 
Jora Minasian has also calculated marginal rates of 
return from research and development expenditures. Using 
1948-1957 data for a sample of seventeen chemical firms, 
Minasian found an average rate of return on gross invest¬ 
ment of 9 percent while the return on research expenditures 
was 54 percent. 
Although not conclusive, the statistical evidence 
reinforces the expectation of a positive association between 
R&D intensity and ROI. The most likely explanation for this 
association is that research and development activity gives 
existing firms in an industry an advantage over prospective 
entrants. Uncertainty regarding the return from R&D outlays 
adds to the hesitancy of new firms in entering the industry. 
Company Size 
When the effects of imperfect competition on ROI are 
21 
For a summary article on research and development 
activity and its effects on rates of return, see Edwin 
Mansfield, ”Industrial Research and Development: Charac¬ 
teristics, Costs, and Diffusion of Results,” Papers and 
Proceeding of the Eighty-First Annual Meeting of the 
American Economic Association (Chicago, 1960), pp. £>5-71 • 
22 
Jora R. Minasian, ’’Research and Development, Pro¬ 
duction Functions, and Rates of Return,” Papers and Pro¬ 
ceedings of the Eighty-First Annual Meeting" of the American 
Economic Association (Chicago, T$58), pp. o0-b5« 
714- 
being considered, firm size is often cited as a possible 
barrier to entry. Prospective entrants may be reluctant 
to join an industry where a large minimum amount of capital 
is necessary to start production. Explaining the relation¬ 
ship between size and rate of return, Baumol says, 
. . . increased money capital will not only increase 
the total profits of the firm, but because it puts 
the firm in a higher echelon of imperfectly competing 
capital groups, it may very well also increase its 
earnings per dollar of investment. . . .^3 
There have been a number of empirical studies that 
test the hypothesis of a positive association between 
average firm size and average industry rate of return. For 
example, Roger Sherman and Robert Tollison added average 
firm size to the Fisher and Hall model described above. 
They found the association between size, measured by 
averaging 1957 and 1964 total assets, and income after 
taxes to net worth to be significant and positive. How¬ 
ever, when a risk variable (variance of return) was added 
to the regression, the size/ROI relation became not sig¬ 
nificant 
^■^Williara J. Baumol, Business Behavior, Value and 
Growth (New York: Macmillan, 195?), p. 33. 
^Roger Sherman and Robert Tollison, "Technology, 
Profit Risk, and Assessments of Market Performance," 
Quarterly Journal of Economics (August, 1972), pp. 448“ 
462. The original model is described in I. N. Fisher and 
G. R. Hall, "Risk and Corporate Rates of Return," Quarterly 
Journal of Economics (February, 1969), pp. 79-92. 
2 9 
^The problems that complicate interpretation of 
variance as discussed above preclude any meaningful con¬ 
clusions about this result. 
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The proper accounting figure to use as a size measure 
has been discussed by Hall and Weiss. In explaining their 
definition, the reciprocal of the logarithm of total assets, 
the authors argue that, "assets are superior to equity . . . 
because it is the size of the total lump of capital, however 
financed, that determines the opportunities available to 
the firm.”^ Use of the logarithmic form is based on their 
assumption that raising an additional percentage of assets 
is more nearly comparable between firms of disparate size 
than the difficulty of raising an additional absolute amount 
of capital. The authors chose the reciprocal as they be¬ 
lieved a larger firm finds it easier to raise an additional 
percentage of assets than does a smaller firm. With either 
of two ROI measures, income after taxes to net worth or 
income after taxes to assets, the regression coefficient 
for the size variable was significant and positive as hypo¬ 
thesized. 
In an intra-industry comparison of ROI and size, 
2 7 
Malitzahu Marcus found only a weak association. Although 
his definitions for ROI (income before taxes to net assets) 
and for size (net assets) are not unusual, Marcus1 study 
^Hall and Weiss, ’’Firm Size and Profitability,” 
p. 322. 
^Malitzahu Marcus, ’’Profitability and Size of Firm: 
Some Further Evidence,” Review of Economics and Statistics 
(February, 1969), pp. 104-107. 
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is unique in its use of intra-industry data since most 
studies relate size and rate of return by industry rather 
than by firm. The weak results indicate there is little 
association between ROI and size within industries. 
The evidence is sufficient to conclude that firm 
size may very well be a significant determinant of ROI. 
Although the best means of measuring size is the subject 
of continued debate, any one of the commonly used asset 
measures seems to exhibit a positive association with rate 
of return. 
Advertising and Promotional Intensity 
Advertising and other promotional activity can be 
such an important determinant of sales that a company with 
a well-established marketing program may have significant 
advantages over potential competitors. High advertising 
and promotional intensity may, therefore, be a barrier to 
entry. 
There have been a number of studies relating adver¬ 
tising and rate of return, including a well-known report 
28 
by William Comanor and Thomas Wilson. Using a regression 
equation with income after taxes to net worth as the 
^William S. Comanor and Thomas Wilson, "Advertising, 
Market Structure, and Performance," Review of Economics and 
Statistics (November, 1967), pp. 423“440*«~" 
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dependent variable and the advertising to sales ratio as one 
of the independent variables, the authors identified adver¬ 
tising as a significant explanatory variable. This rein¬ 
forces the belief that extensive advertising can be an 
important barrier to entry. 
Whereas Comanor and Wilson used a consumer goods in¬ 
dustry sample, Richard Miller conducted a similar study but 
Included both consumer and producer goods Industries.^9 
His results also confirm a significant positive association 
between advertising intensity and rate of return, 
A monograph by Jules Backman attempted to test the 
claim that intensive advertising can lead to anti-competitive 
behavior and above normal rates of return. In reporting the 
empirical results, he says: 
Intensive advertising tends to be accompanied by higher 
reported profit rates. However, the difference in 
return among companies with varying rates of adver¬ 
tising intensity tends to be moderate.30 
Backman suggests that the effects of advertising cannot be 
separated from other ROI determinants such as R&D intensity, 
growth in demand, or risk, and therefore, these variables 
must be considered together. 
A researcher who has written extensively about adver¬ 
tising is critical of accepting the belief that advertising 
leads to monopoly power. Lester Telser states: 
^Richard A. Miller, "Market Structure and Industrial 
Performance.” Journal of Industrial Economics (April, 1969), 
pp. IOI4.-II8. 
^Backman, Advertising and Competition, p. 15k* 
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Everyone knows the contention that advertising is a 
source of monopoly and, therefore, expects a positive 
association between the two* But intensive adver¬ 
tising is often an instrument of competition as well. 
The entry of new firms and the offering of new brands 
is frequently accompanied by high advertising expendi¬ 
tures. Hence advertising can enhance competition. 
Even if advertising does reduce competition in some 
cases, it can increase it in others. The net effect 
reveals itself by the absence of a dependable relation 
between the advertising and the concentration ratios.31 
3he controversy goes on as to whether advertising 
creates monopoly and ultimately leads to higher than com¬ 
petitive rates of return. As stated above by Telser, no 
dependable relation between advertising and concentration 
has been established. Apparently there is a significant, 
positive association between advertising and ROI, but the 
linkage between the two is not clear. 
Another thorny problem is the question of causality, 
since regression and correlation cannot establish the 
direction of cause and effect. It is possible that a 
positive relation exists between advertising and ROI be¬ 
cause a high rate of return provides the financing to 
utilize intensive advertising. Comanor and Wilson, who 
explicitly review this question, offer arguments supportive 
of the conclusion that the direction of causality is from 
advertising to rate of return.^2 
^Lester G. Telser, "Another Look at Advertising and 
Concentration," Journal of Industrial Economics (November, 
1969), p. 94. 
■^Comanor and Wilson, "Advertising, Market Structure, 
and Performance," p. 437* 
79 
Multicollinearity and Interaction 
In the studies cited above there are numerous state¬ 
ments suggesting interaction among the determinants of ROI. 
Growth in demand and R&D activity both may contribute to 
variability of return, a measure of risk; advertising and 
promotional intensity may be correlated with the concentra¬ 
tion ratio; several of the variables may be closely related 
to company size. Multicollinearity among independent 
variables can cause a variable that is significant as a 
determinant of ROI by itself to become not significant when 
included with other independent variables. 
Interaction among the determinants may have important 
effects on rates of return, and these effects may be more 
than just additive. High growth in demand coupled with 
high risk might result in extremely high rates of return 
as investors demand to be compensated for this unique com¬ 
bination of investment characteristics. Similar results 
could be forthcoming if high R&D intensity and high minimum 
size are combined, in this case because of the potential for 
market control. These examples, of course, are merely in¬ 
dicative of the many combinations that might occur. 
Summary 
Two types of ROI determinants have been identified— 
investment characteristics and structural characteristics. 
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In Chapter III, investment characteristics including risk 
and growth in demand were discussed along with an explana¬ 
tion of how these determinants of ROI could lead to above 
normal rates of return even in a competitive industry. 
Hie structural characteristics, discussed in this chapter, 
are measures of market power which also may determine rate 
of return. Of the structural characteristics, the concen¬ 
tration ratio is an indication of potential market control 
while R&£) intensity, company size, and advertising intensity 
are measures of possible barriers to competitive entry. 
There may be other determinants of ROI than the ones 
considered here. However, with the concepts developed to 
date and with the available data, it is unlikely that the 
inclusion of more variables in the ROI model would provide 
much additional information. Most likely the added variables 
would be closely related statistically to the ones already 
discussed. 
The methodology of this study is to combine as many 
of the determinants of ROI as possible into a multiple 
regression model and to evaluate their individual and joint 
effects on ROI. The next chapter explicitly defines each 
of the variables, describes the model, and discusses the 
hypotheses the model is designed to test. 
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CHAPTER V 
A RETURN ON INVESTMENT MODEL 
Hie ROI model developed in this chapter is designed 
to determine if the ethical drug industry’s relatively 
high rate of return can be explained statistically. 
Objective testing of the hypothesized relationships between 
ROI and its determinants is facilitated by the use of a 
symbolic model. 
Hypotheses 
The initial set of hypotheses concerns the relation¬ 
ship between ROI and each of the determinants of return. 
In this study, a positive association between rate of 
return and each of the investment and structural charac¬ 
teristics is hypothesized. 
Once these relationships have been tested, the central 
question regarding the drug industry's rate of return can 
be considered. The hypothesis is that ethical drug industry 
average return on investment is the same as a11-manufacturing 
industries’ average return on investment after consideration 
of investment and structural characteristics. 
General Form 
To test the hypotheses regarding the association 
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between ROI and each of the determinants of ROI, a simple, 
linear, least-squares regression model is used of the form: 
Y = Bq + B^X^ + e 
where Y is ROI, BQ the intercept term, B^ the coefficient 
for the independent variable, the independent variable, 
and e the error term. The error term indicates the degree 
of variation of individual observations around the regres¬ 
sion line. Using data for each independent variable in 
turn, statistical techniques including t and F tests are 
exploited to evaluate the resulting equations. These 
statistical results, along with the logical arguments pre¬ 
sented in Chapters III and IV, are used to specify the 
variables included in the final ROI model. 
The model of return on investment is a cross-sectional, 
least-squares, multiple regression equation with ROI as the 
dependent variable and a series of investment and structural 
characteristics for independent variables. Expressed 
symbolically, the model is 
Y = Bq + ®i^l + + * * • * ®n^n + e 
As in the simple regression model, Y is ROI, Bq the inter¬ 
cept, Bn the coefficients of the independent variables, Xn 
the independent variables, and e the error term. 
The intercept term, B^, has special economic sig¬ 
nificance since it can be interpreted as a rate of return 
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after consideration of investment and structural character¬ 
istics. The influence of these characteristics on ROI is, 
of course, measured by their respective regression co¬ 
efficients. As an adjusted rate of return, Bq can be com¬ 
pared to rates of return from investment in certain govern¬ 
ment securities which are assumed to be unaffected by the 
type of investment and structural characteristics associated 
with the independent variables. 
Definition of the Variables 
In this section each of the variables identified as 
a possible determinant of ROI Is defined. The first three 
explanatory variables (variance, skewness, and growth) are 
investment characteristics, while the other four (concen¬ 
tration ratio, R&D intensity, company size, and advertising 
intensity) are structural characteristics. 
Use of data for only one year in the cross-sectional 
model would tie the results to the unique economic charac¬ 
teristics of that year, and attempts to generalize such 
results would be of questionable validity. Therefore, data 
over several years are averaged to give a single figure for 
each variable for each industry. Unless otherwise noted, 
the time period, t, is nine years for each variable;1 n, 
^For some companies, R&D expenditures are not reported 
for all nine years. In those cases, R&D intensity is com¬ 
puted from the data for the years reported, IJie number of 
years, t, then becomes less than nine. 
the number of companies, is four to twelve per four-dig it 
2 
SIC industry; X is an observation on ROI for one company 
in one year. 
Return on investment. With the goal of making inter¬ 
industry comparisons in mind, ROI is defined as net income 
after taxes (NI) divided by net worth (NW). Each observa¬ 
tion is as follows: 
Industry Average ROI = ~ ~ NI/NW 
Net income after taxes divided by net worth is used 
in the expectation that competitive entry and exit of 
firms would bring this figure towards equality. Net worth 
is used in the denominator because it is rate of return on 
equity which managers should seek to maximize if they are 
acting in the stockholders* best interests. Even under 
pure competition, it would not be expected that diverse 
industries would have equal rates of return on assets be¬ 
cause of different capital structures. For example, if 
banks, with their very high debt ratios, earned the same 
rate of return on assets as manufacturing firms, the banks 
would have extremely high rates of return on equity. There¬ 
fore, it is expected that in competitive long-run equilibrium 
rate of return on equity would tend to be equalized. 
2Table 10 in Appendix II lists the industries with the 
number of companies in each. 
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It was noted in Chapter II that there ia disagreement 
among researchers regarding the effects of capital struc¬ 
ture on ROI and on the risk/return relationship. To 
evaluate the possibility that using return on net worth 
biases the relationship between ROI and the risk measure, 
two alternative configurations of the regression model 
are tested. First, the ROI variable is redefined as rate 
of return on net book assets which gives a return figure 
not affected by financial leverage. Second, the ratio 
of total debt to total assets is added to the regression 
equation with ROI defined as return on net worth. 
Variance. Two measures of risk are incorporated into 
the model. The first is average variance of individual 
company rates of return around the industry mean averaged 
•j 
over time:^ 
Industry Average Variance = 2U _ 
t*— n-1 
This ia an inter-spatial measure of variance of return. 
The denominator of the variance formula is one leas than 
the number of firms in the industry (n-1) to adjust for 
the small sample sizes.^ 
^See Appendix I for additional discussion of the use 
of variance as a measure of risk. 
‘h'he number of companies per industry ranges from 
four to twelve. 
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Since squared deviations give greater weight to extreme 
values, it is possible that variance may be a biased risk 
measure when applied to industries with relatively high 
variability of return. Bias could be present for individual 
industries even though variance and standard deviation as 
measures of risk are highly correlated for an all-manufac¬ 
turing industries sample.^ To test for the possible exis¬ 
tence of bias, the standard deviation is substituted for 
variance in the final equation and the results evaluated. 
A positive association between ROI and variability 
of return is hypothesized under the assumption that the 
higher the ex post variability of return, the greater the 
uncertainty associated with the return. Risk-averse in¬ 
vestors are assumed to dislike uncertainty and, therefore, 
to expect a higher rate of return to offset the uncertainty. 
Skewness. The second risk variable is skewness, 
measured by a dummy variable to eliminate the difficulties 
of interpreting the units of the skewness variable.^ in 
any case, the hypothesis only relates to the sign of the 
skewness measure, not to its value. To compute skewness 
requires finding the second and third moments, m2 and m^, 
^See Appendix I for evidence of the degree of cor¬ 
relation between standard deviation and variance. 
^For a brief discussion of the ambiguities inherent 
in calculating and interpreting values for the coefficient 
of skewness, see Samuel B. Richmond, Statistical Analysis 
(New York: Ronald, 1964), pp. 73“76, 90-95* 
87 
respectively, of the distribution of ROI: 
m2 =ZjX=Il£ 
c n-1 
m =^(X-X)3 
3 n-1 
The coefficient of skewness, B, is the ratio of the third 
moment squared to the second moment cubed: 
B = 
(m2)3 
Therefore, 
Industry Average Skewness = — B 
t ^ 
Each industry is assigned a dummy variable with a 
value of 0, 1, or 2 corresponding to an average co¬ 
efficient of skewness that is positive, zero, or negative.*^ 
As explained in Chapter III, investors are presumed to 
like positive skewness and dislike negative skewness which 
implies a negative ROI/skewness relationship. By assigning 
a higher number (2) to negative skewness and a lower number 
(0) to positive skewness, a positive association is pre¬ 
dicted between ROI and the dummy skewness variable. 
?For a discussion regarding the use of dummy variables, 
see Daniel B. Suits, ’’Use of Dummy Variables in Regression 
Equations,” Journal of the American Statistical Association 
(December, 1^57), pp. 5W-55T.- 
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Growth In demand. As growth is a time concept, a 
cross-sectional study requires the averaging of annual 
rates of growth in demand for individual firms. Annual 
company rates are calculated by fitting a least-squares 
trend line to company sales over time to find the slope 
(S). The industry figure is. 
Industry Average Growth 
The predicted positive association between ROI and 
growth in demand is based on the following rationale : 
When the firms in an industry experience more rapid growth 
in capital requirements than growth in capital supply, 
they must bid up ROI to attract the desired capital. This 
growth premium is required by investors to compensate for 
the costs associated with increasing the proportion of 
their portfolios allocated to firms in the rapidly growing 
industry. A growth premium would be required also, to the 
extent investors associate above average growth with future 
uncertainty. 
Industry concentration. Concentration is measured 
by Bureau of the Census, four-digit SIC industry concen¬ 
tration ratios (CR). Three different sets of ratios are 
used: four- and eight-firm ratios based on value added in 
manufacture and four-firm ratios of total employees. In 
several cases the industries used are defined slightly 
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differently in the data source (Standard and Poor’s Corapustat 
Tape) than the industries in the Bureau of the Census data. 
To obtain concentration ratios for these industries, a tech¬ 
nique suggested by Stigler is used whereby the desired 
ratios are calculated by combining industries using industry 
Q 
value added as weights. 
A positive association between ROI and concentration 
ratio is hypothesized based on the rationale that the 
potential for market control is greater in a concentrated 
industry. Exercise of this potential is expected to lead 
to artificially high rates of return. 
Research and Development Intensity. The measure for 
R&D intensity is average company R&D expenditures divided 
by company net sales in each time period (R&D/S). The form 
of the variable is. 
Industry Average R&D Intensity = ^ ^ 1 R&D/S 
Company R&D expenditures are used because R&D outlays are 
reported in this manner in the data source. For inter¬ 
industry comparisons, company outlays seem to be the proper 
figure as opposed to total industry R&D expenditures since 
Q 
U.S., Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufacturers, 
1967> Vol. 1, Summary and Subject Statistics (Washington, 
D.CT: Government Printing Office, 1971). 
q 
George J. Stigler, Capital and Rates of Return in 
Manufacturing Industries (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1463)7 PP* 206-211. 
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the latter figure includes government outlays. 
R&D intensity is expected to be positively associated 
with rate of return on the assumption that research activity 
can create a barrier to entry allowing existing firms to 
insulate themselves from potential competitors. Uiis 
situation could result in artificially high rates of return. 
Company size. Size, which may represent a capital 
barrier to entry, is measured as total assets less accumu¬ 
lated depreciation (TA). Two configurations are considered: 
absolute total assets in dollars and the logarithm to the 
base ten of total assets. Rie hypothesis of a positive 
association between ROI and each of these size measures 
derives from size being a possible barrier to competitive 
entry. The form of the variable is. 
Industry Average Company Size = 
Use of the logarithmic form is based on the 
assumption that raising an additional percentage of assets 
is more nearly comparable between firms of disparate size 
than the difficulty of raising an absolute amount of 
capital. 
Advertising and Promotional Intensity. This possible 
ROI determinant is measured by the ratio of company adver¬ 
tising and promotional expense to company sales (AE/S): 
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Industry Average Advertising _ 1 sr~ 1 ae/S 
and Promotional Intensity t n 
Many companies do not report advertising and promotional 
expenses as a separate item but lump these outlays with 
general and administrative expense. 
The regression model does not include an advertising 
intensity variable, in part because of the ambiguous results 
of other studies, but more importantly, only about 10 per¬ 
cent of the sample of firms taken from the Corapustat Tape 
included data on advertising and promotional expense.^ 
It was decided that the addition of data from a different 
sample of firms to get an average advertising intensity 
figure for each industry would lead to interpretational 
problems. 
Multicollinearity 
Two methods are used to evaluate the extent of 
multicollinearity among the ROI determinants used in the 
model. The first is to study the partial correlation 
coefficients. The second method uses correlation tech¬ 
niques: certain determinants of ROI are picked for use as 
the dependent variable with other determinants as indepen¬ 
dent variables in a regression equation. Particular 
■^See Chapter IV for a review of prior research 
regarding the association between ROI and advertising 
intensity. 
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combinations are based on the logical associations discussed 
in Chapters III and IV, For instance, some researchers 
have suggested that growth in demand and R&D intensity are 
related to ROI because investments with high growth rates 
or high R&D intensity are riskier than investments without 
these characteristics. Therefore, the risk measure, 
variance of return, is used as the dependent variable with 
growth in demand and R&D intensity as independent variables. 
A second test uses the concentration ratio as the 
dependent variable with R&D intensity and company size as 
independent variables. This combination relates the con¬ 
centration ratio as a measure of potential market power to 
two measures of possible barriers to entry. 
The correlations calculated using these combinations 
of structural and investment characteristics help to explain 
why some of the variables are not statistically significant 
and help also in the evaluation of whether R&D intensity 
and growth in demand are in fact alternative risk measures. 
Summary 
A cross-sectional, multiple regression model was 
formulated in this chapter which relates ROI to inter- 
spatial variance of return, skewness of return, growth in 
demand, concentration ratio, R&D intensity, and company 
size. Each of these investment and structural characteristics 
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was defined explicitly using a rationale developed by 
logical reasoning and a review of prior research. 
/. 
The hypothesized relationships between rate of 
return and each of these possible ROI determinants are 
tested in Chapter VI leading to a final model of return 
on investment which is used to study ethical drug industry 
ROI. 
f 
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CHAPTER VI 
TESTING AND USING THE MODEL 
One purpose of developing a model of ROI is to pro¬ 
vide a means of testing statistically hypotheses regarding 
industry rates of return. The model described in the 
previous chapter is used to compare ethical drug industry 
ROI with the rate of return for a sample of other manu¬ 
facturing industries. 
Before using the model to study the drug industry, 
it is necessary to test statistically the significance of 
the industry’s apparent high rate of return. Second, the 
significance of the model's components must be tested and 
evaluated. The entire model is then evaluated using various 
statistical methods and using the aerospace industry in a 
test run. The final step is to forecast ethical drug in¬ 
dustry ROI and compare the result with the observed rate. 
Hypotheses 
The main hypothesis is that ethical drug industry 
average return on investment is the same as all-manufacturing 
industries average return on investment after consideration 
of the determinants of ROI. Use of these determinants in 
the model requires acceptance of the hypothesis that there 
is a significant positive association between ROI and each 
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of the six determinants whioh are measured by variance of 
return, skewness of return, growth in demand, concentration 
ratio, R&D intensity, and company size.^ 
Data 
Book value data were obtained from Standard and Poor’s 
Compustat Tape for a random sample of 350 companies grouped 
into 41 manufacturing industries. Elimination of all in¬ 
dustries containing fewer than four companies resulted in 
p 
a sample of 1 45 companies in 23 industries. For each 
company, the observations were then adjusted for mergers 
and acquisitions and transformed into the measures of the 
ROI determinants. Industry concentration ratios were 
taken from the 1967 Census of Manufacturers.^ 
^Throughout this chapter, any relationship termed 
significant refers to its being statistically significant. 
2 
See Appendix II for a list of the industries along 
with their SIC numbers and the number of companies in each 
industry. Industries with fewer than i| companies were 
eliminated to lessen the statistical effects of extremely 
small industry samples. 
Adjustments for mergers and acquisitions were made 
to the extent the data for making such adjustments were 
reported in Moody’s Industrial Manuals (New York: Moody’s 
Investors Services, Inc., 1963-1971) • A number of com¬ 
panies were eliminated because there were insufficient 
adjustment data available. 
^U.S., Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufacturers, 
1967. Vol. 1, Summary and Subject Statistics (Washington,- 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971)* 
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Rates of Return 
When rates of return are compared without holding the 
ROI determinants constant, average rate of return for the 
ethical drug industry is significantly higher than for 
the all-manufacturing sample. This relationship is depicted 
in Figure 3 by plotting all-manufacturing ROI along with 
the least-squares trend line for the years 1963-1971.^ 
As the trend line is calculated from a sample, it is neces¬ 
sary to establish a confidence interval for the trend line.^ 
The equation for the boundaries of the confidence interval 
is 
Y = B0 + + tS 
where Bq is the Y intercept, B-^ is the slope of the trend 
line, denotes time, t is the student's t value, and S 
is the standard error of the trend line. Ethical drug 
industry ROI is then plotted with the least-squares trend 
line for the same time period.^ 
Ihe drug industry observations and their trend line 
^The data are listed in Appendix II. The all¬ 
manufacturing sample does not include the ethical drug 
industry. 
^For an explanation of this technique, see Samuel B. 
Richmond, Statistical Analysis (2d ed.; New York: Ronald, 
196]+), pp. ldd-190; and Arthur S. Goldberger, Econometric 
Theory (New York: Wiley, 1961+), p. 179. 
?The companies in the ethical drug industry sample 
are listed in Appendix II. 
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are above the upper boundary of the a11-manufacturing con¬ 
fidence interval; this establishes that before consideration 
of the ROI determinants, ethical drug industry average rate 
of return is significantly higher than a11-manufacturing 
industries average ROI. The trend lines for the two samples 
are roughly parallel and have a negative slope over the 
nine years. This coordinated movement of the rates of 
return indicates that ROI for the drug industry is affected 
by cyclical change in about the same way as that of manu¬ 
facturing industries in general. Because the time span is 
relatively short, no meaningful interpretation of the nega- 
g 
tive slope is possible. 
Regression Results 
The first step in attempting to establish the 
determinants of ROI as significant explanatory variables is 
to use each individually in a simple linear regression. In 
this way, the regression coefficient of each of the vari- 
o 
ables and the summary statistics in Table I4. are calculated. 
In the simple regression runs, skewness and growth are 
significant; none of the other variables is significant; and 
only variance and R&D intensity have the hypothesized positive 
®The years 1963-1971 roughly cover one business cycle. 
To interpret the meaning of the negative slope would require 
at least several cycles and preferably more. 
^The regression data are listed in Appendix II. 
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TABLE 4 
STATISTICAL RESULTS--SIMPLE REGRESSION 
Independent 
Variable R 
F 
Test 
t 
Test (D.P.) 
Level of 
Significance 
Variance .28 1.69 1.31 20 Not Significant 
Skewness • 43 4.61 2.15 20 .05 
Growth .60 11.45 3-39 20 .01 
R&D Intensity .12 0.20 o.45 15 Not Significant 
Size: 
Total Assets .08 0.12 0.35 20 Not Significant & 
Negative 
Log^Q Total .07 0.11 0.32 20 Not Significant & 
Assets Negative 
Concentration 
Ratio: 
4-Firm Value .05 0.04 0.20 20 Not Significant & 
Added Negative 
8-Firm Value .02 0.01 0.10 20 Not Significant & 
Added Negative 
4-Firm Total .33 2.39 1.55 20 Not Significant & 
Employees Negative 
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sign. Although not quite significant, the t value for 
variance is sufficiently high to indicate that this variable 
is a potentially useful explanatory variable for ROI. Of 
the remaining variables including R&D intensity, size, and 
concentration ratio, only the Iv-firm total employees measure 
of the concentration ratio has any indication of potential 
significance; however, its coefficient has the wrong sign. 
Although the discussion of these regression results is de¬ 
ferred until later, it should be noted here that a non¬ 
significant variable in a simple regression equation may 
become significant when included with other independent 
variables. 
The next stage in evaluating the significance of the 
ROI determinants is to test the six measures together in a 
multiple regression model. For the first run, only the 17 
industries with R&D intensity data are included.1^ 
As summarized in Table 5, the statistical results 
indicate that only skewness is significant. Again, the t 
statistic for variance is sufficiently high to indicate at 
least potential explanatory value. Growth, a significant 
variable in the previous run, is not significant in this 
multiple regression; however, it does have the predicted 
positive sign. Size, R&D intensity, and concentration ratio 
^For 5 of the 22 industries sampled, data on R&D 
expenditures are not reported on the Corapustat Tape. 
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TABLE 5 
STATISTICAL RESULTS—MULTIPLE REGRESSION 
(17 Industries) 
Independent Variable t Test (10 
DP) 
Level of Significance 
Variance 1.76 Not Significant 
Skewness 1.86 .10 • 
Growth 0.90 Not Significant 
R&D Intensity 0.65 Not Significant 
Concentration Ratio 0.21 Not Significant &: 
(4-Firm Value Added) Negative 
Size 0.10 Not Significant & 
(Log^Q Total Assets) Negative 
Correlation Matrix 
ROI VARIANCE SKEWNESS SIZE R&D GROWTH CR 
ROI 1.0 .I4.O3 .426 -.079 .114 .523 - .090 
VARIANCE 1.000 - .267 -.281 .483 .479 .281 
SKEWNESS 1.000 .105 - .276 .145 - • 492 
SIZE 1.000 -.264 -.225 .160 
R&D 1.000 .204 .165 
GROWTH 1.000 .207 
CR 1 .000 
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are all again not significant, and of these three variables, 
only R&D intensity has the expected positive sign. Just one 
measure for the concentration ratio and one measure for size 
are used as earlier results indicated that the different 
measures for each variable are essentially interchangeable. 
In this first run of the multivariate model, statistical 
testing is hampered by the few degrees of freedom avail- 
able.11 
By eliminating the R&D intensity variable it is pos¬ 
sible to include all 22 industries in the second run of 
12 
the multiple regression model. Variance, skewness, and 
growth are all significant, and each has the predicted 
positive relation with ROI. Neither the concentration 
ratio nor size is significant, and the concentration ratio 
has a negative sign. 
In the two multiple regressions and in the simple 
regression runs, the concentration ratio, R&D intensity, 
and size are nowhere significant. Therefore, these three 
variables are dropped from further consideration. This 
lack of significance may be accounted for by collinearity 
between the variables that are significant including 
ll-The first multiple regression run which includes 
the R&D intensity variable has only 10 degrees of freedom. 
With so few degrees of freedom, the F and t values must be 
relatively high to be significant. 
The statistical summary of this run is contained 
in Table 6. 
103 
TABLE 6 
STATISTICAL RESULTS--MULTIPLE REGRESSION 
(22 Industries)a 
Independent Variable t Test (16 DF) Level of Significance 
Variance 1.73 .10 
Skewness 2.08 .05 
Growth 2.96 .01 
Concentration Ratio 1.47 Not Significant & 
(If-Firm Value Added) Negative 
Size .93 Not Significant 
(Log^Q Total Assets) 
Correlation Matrix 
ROI VARIANCE SKEWNESS SIZE GROWTH CR 
ROI 1.0 .279 •433 -.072 .603 -.045 
VARIANCE 1.000 -.368 -.348 .304 .102 
SKEWNESS 1.000 .100 .098 - .2 79 
SIZE 1.000 -.120 .294 
GROWTH l.oco .458 
CR 1.000 
aR&D Intensity omitted for lack of data. 
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variance, skewness, and growth, and those that are not sig¬ 
nificant. For example, the partial correlation coefficient 
for variance and R&D intensity is 0.48. Collinearity can 
cause a variable to be not significant because the sig¬ 
nificant variable with which it is collinear steals the 
nonsignificant variable’s explanatory power. 
A third run of the multivariate model uses only those 
variables that are significant in at least one previous 
11 
run: variance, skewness, and growth. J In this run, each 
of the independent variables is statistically significant 
and has the predicted sign. As measured by the F test, 
the equation is significant at the .01 level. By using a 
Durbin-Watson Test, it is concluded that no serial corre¬ 
lation exists in the error terms. ^ Ihis final equation is 
accepted as a significant model of ROI for use in inter¬ 
industry comparisons. 
Two modifications to the final equation are made to 
isolate possible bias created by variations in capital 
structure. First, return on net book assets is substituted 
for return on net worth. Using this configuration, the 
same three variables are significant (variance, skewness, 
and growth) while all the other independent variables are 
^See Table 7 for the statistical summary. 
^This test is described in J. Durbin and G. S. Watson. 
"Testing for Serial Correlation in Least Squares Regression, 
Biometrika (December, 1950)* PP* 4°9-428. 
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TABLE 7 
STATISTICAL RESULTS--FINAL EQUATION 
ROI = .0440 + 3.4^8(Variance) + 0.020(Skewness) + 0.232(Growth) 
R = 0.77 F Test =8.74 (4>!8 DF) Equation significant at .01 
Independent Variable_t Test (18 DF) Level of Significance 
Variance 2.10 .05 
Skewness 3.02 .01 
Growth 2.75 .05 
Correlation Matrix 
ROI 
ROI 1.0 
VARIANCE 
SKEWNESS 
GROWTH 
VARIANCE SKEWNESS 
.279 -433 
1.000 -.368 
1.000 
GROWTH 
.603 
• 303 
.098 
1.000 
Durbin-Watson Test (k=3 n=22) 
Positive Test 
Negative Test 
= 2.52 
= 1.48 
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not significant. Second, the debt ratio, total debt to 
total assets, is included as an independent variable in the 
equation with return on net worth as the dependent variable. 
The debt ratio is not significant and has a negative sign. 
Consequently, there is no evidence that using return on net 
worth biases the risk/return relationship. 
To evaluate the extent of collinearity, several 
regressions are run using different combinations of the 
determinants of ROI. First, variance is used for the 
dependent variable with R&D intensity and growth as inde¬ 
pendent variables to test the idea that relatively high 
R&D expenditures and rapid growth create risk. The co¬ 
efficient of multiple correlation (R) for this run is 
0.65. As an explanatory variable for variance, growth is 
Just barely significant at the .05 level, and R&D intensity 
is not significant at all. These results provide weak sup¬ 
port for the contention that relatively high growth results 
in high risk. 
A second collinearity test relates R&D intensity and 
size as measures of barriers to entry to the concentration 
ratio, a measure of potential market power. Ihe multiple 
correlation coefficient is only 0.31, and neither size nor 
R&D intensity is significant. Although this test provides 
no support for a significant association between the con¬ 
centration ratio and the two measures of barriers to entry, 
the interpretation of the result is hampered by the limited 
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R&D data and by the problems which are inherent in the con¬ 
centration ratio as a measure of market power.^ 
Discussion of Regression Results 
Using the ROI model to study ethical drug industry 
rate of return depends on acceptance of the individual 
variables chosen as ROI determinants. The model and the 
data can be evaluated to some extent by comparing these 
empirical results with the results of previous studies. 
In this section, such comparisons are made in addition to 
a review of why each variable is included or left out of 
the final model.^ 
Intercept term. The intercept term is the rate of 
return left after allowing for the investment character¬ 
istics measured by variance, skewness, and growth, and 
therefore, it can be compared to the rate of return on 
government securities presumably not affected by these 
characteristics. At .044-0 or 4*4 percent, the intercept 
term is s3ightly lower than the 4«74 percent, 1963-1971 
average yield on three month U.S. Treasury Bills.^ As 
^See the discussion of the R&D intensity and con¬ 
centration ratio variables in Chapter IV for a review of 
these problems. 
^The final model and the associated summary statis¬ 
tics are shown in Table 7* 
17 
'The figures are from, U.S., Department of Commerce, 
Survey of Current Business (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing 0??ice,“ 1<&3-I9?1). 
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the intercept term is about the same as the Treasury Bill 
rate, the conclusion is that the equation does take out 
premiums associated with risk and growth leaving a rate of 
return adjusted for these investment characteristics. 
In models using fewer explanatory variables, the 
intercept term is considerably higher than the Treasury 
Bill rate. For example, the figure in Cootner and Holland’s 
equation is 8.20 percent, and Conrad and Plotkin find an 
intercept term of 8.6 percent. In both studies, only 
variance is considered. If the effects of skewness and 
growth are included, the expected result would be a lower 
intercept figure such as the one predicted by this model. 
Variance. As hypothesized, inter-spatial variance of 
return is a statistically significant explanatory variable 
for rate of return, and therefore, it is used in the final 
ROI model. 
Skewness. The prediction of a positive association 
between ROI and the dummy skewness variable is confirmed by 
the regression results. This is in agreement with prior 
studies which have generally found a negative association 
between ROI and the value of the coefficient of skewness; 
1 fi 
Paul H. Cootner and Daniel M. Holland, ’’Rate of 
Return and Business Risk,” The Bell Journal of Economics 
and Management Science (Autumn. 1970}," p. 218; Gordon R. 
Conrad and Irving H. Plotkin, ”Risk/Return: U.S. Industry 
Pattern,” Harvard Business Review (March-April, 1968), 
p. 95. 
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an inverted result is obtained in this study by assigning a 
lower number (0) to the dummy variable for positive skew- 
19 
ness and a higher number (2) for negative skewness. Use 
of a dummy variable eliminates the interpretive problems 
and concentrates on the sign of the skewness measure. 
There may be additional information to be gained by using 
the value of the skewness coefficient as well as its sign, 
but in the absence of a measure of skewness which can be 
adequately interpreted as a risk measure, use of a dummy 
variable seems more reasonable and logical. The conclusion 
is that given present understanding of skewness as a deter¬ 
minant of ROI, only tests regarding the sign of the coeffi¬ 
cient can be meaningfully interpreted. The empirical re¬ 
sults provide support for the hypothesis that there is a 
significant association between ROI and skewness, and there¬ 
fore, the variable is used in the final model. 
Growth in demand. The finding of a significant 
positive association between return on investment and growth 
in demand confirms the hypothesis, and growth is used in 
the ROI model. An attempt is made to test empirically the 
contention that growth is a form of risk by using variance 
as the dependent variable and growth as an independent 
variable in a multiple regression. As growth is not a 
■^The use of a dummy variable to measure skewness is 
explained in Chapter III. 
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significant explanatory variable for the risk measure, there 
is no support for a risk and growth association. 
Industry concentration. Although the expectation of 
an association between concentration and rate of return is 
central to the theory of noncompetitive markets, the con¬ 
centration ratio is not a significant variable in the re¬ 
gression model. This is not too different from other 
studies' empirical results which provide weak support for 
20 
the hypothesis of a positive association. Consequently, 
the variable is not included in the final model. 
Lack of significance for the concentration variable 
has several possible explanations. First, the ratio only 
measures potential market control, and companies may not 
consistently exercise that power. In other words, the 
variable may not be significant because the concentration 
ratio data are inadequate for the task of measuring the 
actual use of market power. Second, the well-known short¬ 
comings of the Bureau of the Census data may affect the 
21 
significance of the variable. A third possible explana¬ 
tion is raulticollinearity. For example, the coefficient 
of partial correlation with skewness is 0.28 and with growth 
is O.ij.6. 
20 
See Chapter IV for reviews of research pertaining to 
the concentration ratio. 
21 
These shortcomings are described in the section on 
concentration ratios in Chapter IV. 
Ill 
Research and Development Intensity, The hypothesis 
that R&D intensity is positively associated with ROI is 
not confirmed, and as a result, the variable is not used. 
Testing this variable is hampered by incomplete data. In 
five of the 22 industries sampled, no R&D. data were obtain¬ 
able, and in the remaining 17 industries, data for many 
firms were available only for a portion of the nine year 
sample period. Until more adequate data are available, 
little satisfactory testing can be done regarding the 
effects of R&D outlays on ROI. 
The collinearity R&D intensity has with other deter¬ 
minants of ROI also may cause the variable to be not sig¬ 
nificant. For example, the coefficients of partial correla¬ 
tion are O.I4.8 with variance, 0.28 with skewness, and 0.26 
with size. Ihe degree of correlation with variance lends 
some support to the idea that high R&D expenditures create 
risk. When R&D intensity is correlated with the concen¬ 
tration ratio, there is only a weak association, and conse¬ 
quently, little evidence that concentration is associated 
with R&D outlays. As stated previously, the poor R&D 
data preclude drawing any defensible conclusions. 
Company size. The size variable’s coefficient is not 
significant, and its sign is negative rather than positive 
as hypothesized. These results are compatible with those 
of Hall and Weiss who find a significant positive association 
between ROI and the reciprocal of the logarithm of total 
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assets, A positive association with the reciprocal of a 
measure is comparable to a negative association with the 
measure itself. 
Lack of significance for the size variable may well 
be inherent in the data sample. The Compustat Tape con¬ 
tains data on those companies that have the greatest in¬ 
vestor appeal which tends to bias the sample towards large 
companies. As a result, inter-industry size differences 
may not be revealed. Hall and Weiss1 use of the much 
broader Internal Revenue Service data may account for the 
variable being significant in their study. 
Another possible explanation for size not being sig¬ 
nificant is that variable’s collinearity with variance; 
the partial coefficient of correlation is 0.35. Because 
size is not a significant explanatory variable for ROI, it 
is not included in the final model. 
Evaluation of the statistical results leads to the 
conclusion that the final equation is an acceptable model 
which relates ROI to variance of return, skewness of re¬ 
turn, and growth in demand. The choice of the independent 
variables is based on both statistical and logical relation 
ships. That only three out of the six ROI determinants con 
sidered are jointly significant is not surprising, given 
22 
Marshall Hall and Leonard Weiss, "Firm Size and 
Profitability," Review of Economics and Statistics (August, 
1967), pp. 319- 33T: 
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current understanding of these variables. As shown by the 
partial correlation coefficients, the measures tend to over¬ 
lap which may result in the explanatory power of the ex¬ 
cluded variables being stolen by the significant variables. 
Test of the Model 
The final regression equation which explicitly con¬ 
siders investment characteristics is used to forecast 
ethical drug industry average ROI, and the forecast is then 
compared to the industry’s observed rate. Before doing 
this, it seems prudent to test the model by forecasting 
ROI for a manufacturing industry other than the drug in¬ 
dustry. 
For several reasons the aerospace industry has been 
chosen for this test. In a recent study, the claim is 
made that this industry has an ROI below what is necessary 
23 
to compensate investors for the risk involved. Conrad 
and Plotkin similarly find that the aerospace industry ex¬ 
hibits relatively high risk while ROI is near the all- 
O) 
manufacturing mean. ** A lower than expected ROI is, of 
course, the opposite situation than exists for the ethical 
2 
^Aerospace Research Center, Aerospace Profits Vs. 
Risks (Washington, D.C.: Aerospace Industries Association 
of America, 1971). 
2^Conrad and Plotkin, ”Risk/Return: U.S. Industry 
Pattern,” p. 9I4.. 
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drug industry which is charged with having a rate that is 
too high. 
Using data for the aerospace industry should indicate 
if tiie model is biased. In light of claims that the in¬ 
dustry has a rate of return below what would be expected 
given the investment characteristics of the industry, the 
model should produce a forecasted ROI above the observed 
rate. The procedure used is first to locate observed all- 
manufacturing average ROI and observed aerospace industry 
average ROI in Figure I4.Forecast aerospace industry ROI 
is then computed by substituting aerospace industry values 
for the independent variables into the model which gives a 
conditional expectation on ROI. By exploiting the t dis¬ 
tribution, the lower boundary of the forecast interval can 
be found: 
Forecast Interval = Forecast ROI + tS^ 
where t is the t value at the .01 confidence level and Sf 
26 
is the forecast error. 
Observed aerospace ROI is below both the all-manu¬ 
facturing industries average ROI and below the lower 
boundary of the 99 percent confidence interval forecast 
^The aerospace industry is not included in the all¬ 
manufacturing industries sample in this test. 
26 
For an explanation of this technique, see Gold- 
berger. Econometric Iheory, pp. 168-171* 
H5 
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Aerospace Industry - Forecast (13.9$) 
A11-Manufacturing - Observed (13.2$) 
Aerospace Industry - Forecast Interval 
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Aerospace Industry - Observed (10.3$) 
5 
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Fig. l|..—Aerospace industry - forecasted ROI 
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from the model; therefore, aerospace industry average rate 
of return is indeed less than would be expected after con¬ 
sideration of the investment characteristics measured by 
variance, skewness, and growth. 
This result could occur also because the aerospace 
industry is so unique as to not belong in the same regres¬ 
sion as the all-manufacturing sample. The Chow Test is 
designed to determine if one or more additional sets of 
observations belong to the same regression as a previous 
27 
set. ' The equation for the test is 
Chow Test = A~B/df 
B/df 
where A is the error sum of squares of the original set 
plus the additional observations and B is the error sum 
of squares for just the original set. Each sum of squares 
is adjusted for the respective degrees of freedom (df). 
The test is distributed as the F ratio. Adding the aero¬ 
space industry observations to the all-manufacturing re¬ 
gression produces a Chow Test figure of 2.27. As this is 
less than the F value of L|..L|.l at the .01 level of signif¬ 
icance, it is concluded that the aerospace observations 
belong to the same regression as those of the other 
2?This test is explained in Gregory C. Chow, "Test 
of Equality Between Sets of Coefficients in Two Linear 
Regressions," Econometrics (July, I960), pp. 591-60l|.. 
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manufacturing industries. 
Use of the model to forecast aerospace industry rate 
of return generates the expected result. Considering its 
level of risk and rate of growth, one would expect the 
industry to have a higher ROI than it does. Taken with 
the statistical tests performed, this result reinforces 
the conclusion that the regression model is a suitable 
device for forecasting ROI for manufacturing industries. 
Ethical Drug Industry Rate of Return 
Using the same methods and techniques as in the pre¬ 
vious section, a forecast is made of ethical drug industry 
ROI, and the result is compared to the observed rate of 
return for the industry. The hypothesis to be tested is 
that ethical drug industry average return on investment is 
the same as a11-manufacturing industries average return on 
investment after consideration of the characteristics 
measured by variance, skewness, and growth. 
The sequence for forecasting drug industry ROI is as 
follows: first, a11-manufacturing average ROI and observed 
P A 
ethical drug industry average ROI are located in Figure 
Ethical drug industry ROI is then forecast by substituting 
the industry’s figures for the three independent variables 
28 
The a11-manufacturing industries sample does not 
include the ethical drug industry in this test. 
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which provides a conditional expectation on ROI. Finally, 
the forecast interval is calculated by use of the t value, 
and the upper boundary of the interval located. 
A Chow Test is again used to test the hypothesis that 
the ethical drug data belong to the same regression as the 
a11-manufacturing sample. The 3*53 test figure allows 
acceptance of the hypothesis. 
As the drug industry forecast is less than the observed 
industry rate, the forecast alone does not account for the 
observed industry ROI. Both observed and forecast ethical 
drug industry rates of return are well above the observed 
a11-manufacturing rate. The forecast rate of 18.0 percent 
is I4..8 percentage points above the observed all-manufacturing 
rate of 13*2 percent which reflects a premium for risk and 
growth. However, the forecast rate is still 1^.2 percentage 
points below the observed drug industry rate of 22.2 percent. 
A confidence interval must be calculated because the 
forecast is based on the regression line which contains 
errors as shown by the error term and because the drug 
industry data introduced into the equation are a sample 
which contains potential errors. As the question being con¬ 
sidered is whether drug industry ROI is above what would be 
expected given its investment characteristics, only the 
upper boundary of the forecast confidence interval is 
plotted. 
Hie width of the confidence interval reflects the 
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lack of precision of the data and of the model as a fore¬ 
casting device. Although a more precise model would produce 
a narrower confidence interval, this does not necessarily 
imply that the upper boundary of the confidence interval 
would be lowered. A more precise model might generate a 
higher forecast rate of return. 
Ethical drug industry observed ROI is below the upper 
boundary of the forecast interval, and therefore, the hypo¬ 
thesis is accepted that ethical drug industry average return 
on investment is the same as all-manufacturing industries 
average return on investment after consideration of the 
three investment characteristics. Alternatively stated, 
the excess of observed drug industry ROI can be statis¬ 
tically explained by variance, skewness, and growth. 
Drug industry ROI is also forecast using the standard 
deviation in place of variance as the measure of risk. The 
forecast figure is then 17.86 percent, and the upper boundary 
of the forecast interval is 23*59 percent. These results 
show that ethical drug industry risk is not exaggerated by 
using variance instead of the standard deviation to measure 
risk. 
It should be noted that the investment characteristics 
included in the model are not measures of market structure. 
According to the model, a perfectly competitive industry 
might exhibit an average rate of return above the all¬ 
manufacturing average as the result of high variance, 
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positive skewness, and rapid growth. This is not to suggest 
that the ethical drug industry is competitive or monopo¬ 
listic, only that market structure is not related to the 
final model and that drug industry ROI can be explained 
without reference to noncompetitive advantages. 
These empirical results can be compared to those of 
several other studies which have attempted to explain drug 
industry ROI. By holding growth in demand constant. Barges 
and Hickey can explain only part of the excess of drug 
industry ROI over the all-manufacturing average rate.^ 
Their results show a 3*9 percentage point growth premium 
which leaves an additional 8.1^ percentage point gap of 
unexplained rate of return over the 12.9 percent all¬ 
manufacturing industries rate. The observed drug industry 
rate is 25.2 percent return on assets (before taxes). 
Conrad and Plotkin study risk as a determinant of 
30 
ROI. Using regression techniques to hold risk constant, 
they also are unable to explain completely drug industry 
rate of return. Their model predicts a rate of approximately 
15*0 percent, but the observed drug industry rate is 17.5 per 
cent which leaves an unexplained portion of 2.5 percentage 
points. 
^Alexander Barges and Brian R. Hickey, "Drug Industry 
Profits." Financial Analysts Journal (May-June, 19o8), 
pp. 75-03. 
30 
Conrad and Plotkin, "Risk/Return: U.S. Industry 
Pattern." 
122 
By jointly considering the effects of two measures of 
risk, variance and skewness, along with the effects of growth 
in demand, this study statistically explains the excess of 
observed drug industry rate of return over a11-manufacturing 
ROI. 
Summary 
This chapter describes the testing of the ROI model 
and its use in comparing drug industry ROI to all-manu¬ 
facturing ROI. The components of the model are evaluated 
by testing the hypothesis of a significant association 
between ROI and each of the six ROI determinants. For 
variance, skewness, and growth the hypothesis is accepted, 
but for the determinants measured by R&D intensity, con¬ 
centration ratio, and firm size, it is rejected as the 
latter variables are not statistically significant. Adver¬ 
tising and promotional intensity could not be tested for 
lack of data. 
The final ROI model with variance of return, skewness 
of return, and growth in demand as explanatory variables is 
evaluated as a forecasting device using aerospace industry 
data. Forecast industry ROI is slightly above the all¬ 
manufacturing industries average which agreed with the 
a priori prediction. Considering the results of the statis¬ 
tical tests along with successfully forecasting aerospace 
ROI, it is concluded that the model is a suitable device 
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for forecasting rates of return for manufacturing industries. 
By explicitly allowing for various possible statistical 
errors, the model is able to explain the ethical drug in¬ 
dustry’s relatively high rate of return using the deter¬ 
minants of ROI. Therefore, the hypothesis is accepted 
that ethical drug industry average return on investment is 
the same as all-manufacturing industries average return on 
investment after consideration of the determinants of ROI. 
These empirical results have a variety of useful 
implications. One comes from the unsuccessful attempt to 
include as many as six ROI determinants in the same ex¬ 
planatory equation. Use of this many variables together 
is not successful because the variables are imprecise and 
overlap in their association with ROI. Also, the available 
data are less than ideal for use in relating ROI to its 
determinants. 
The research does result in a model that can be used 
to explain ROI for manufacturing industries where risk and 
growth are important determinants of ROI. Various statis¬ 
tics including the F, t, and Durbin-Watson tests which are 
used to evaluate the model lead to the conclusion that the 
model is an acceptable and adequate device for forecasting 
manufacturing industries’ rate of return. The model does 
explain the ethical drug industry’s relatively high ROI, 
an accomplishment that other models have not achieved. 
1 
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CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The ethical drug industry has been extensively 
examined with particular attention having been focused on 
its relatively high rate of return on investment. Both 
governmental investigators and academic researchers have 
attributed the relatively high return on investment to the 
noncompetitive structural characteristics exhibited by the 
industry. The existence of product differentiation through 
effective advertising of brand-name products, extensive 
research activity coupled with the patent privilege, and 
the existence of other barriers to competitive entry are 
examples of the industry’s structural characteristics. 
High relative and absolute rate of return is often cited 
as a summary measure for these indications that competition, 
at least in the classical sense, is absent. 
The drug industry’s rate of return, then, has been 
used as an indication, if not proof, of anti-competitive 
behavior. However, use of ROI as evidence of noncompetitive 
advantages has led to disagreement regarding the definition 
of ROI, the determinants of ROI, and the proper method for 
making inter-industry ROI comparisons. 
Of the various definitions of return on investment, 
each of which has its own interpretation, there is no agreed 
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upon form for us© in inter-industry comparisons. The defi¬ 
nition used in this study is based on the contention that 
in competitive equilibrium net income after taxes to net 
worth tends to be equalized. It was further argued that 
an after taxes figure properly reflects the effects of 
capital structure as a part of the input mix. 
To identify the determinants of ROI, a series of 
structural and investment characteristics were studied which 
generally have been associated with rate of return. The 
linkage between ROI and the investment characteristics was 
derived from the proposition that under competitive con¬ 
ditions there is a normal rate of return composed of pure 
interest plus a premium for relatively high risk and/or 
growth in demand. 
The hypothesis of a positive association between risk 
and rate of return resulted from assuming investors are 
risk averse. In other words, investors were posited to 
require a risk premium as compensation for uncertainty 
regarding future receipt of return on investment. Two 
measures of risk were used: inter-spatial variance and 
skewness of the distribution of ROI. 
Another investment characteristic, growth in demand, 
was hypothesized to be positively associated with rate of 
return utilizing the following rationale: To fulfill 
relatively rapid growth in product demand, the firms in 
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an industry must increase their share of available capital 
supply. Investors are assumed to demand a growth premium 
as compensation for increasing the concentration of their 
investment portfolios when they provide the required capital. 
Assuming that under noncompetitive conditions firms 
can maintain artificially high rates of return, several 
structural characteristics were examined as potential ROI 
determinants. Average company size and R&D intensity repre¬ 
sented measures of possible barriers to entry, and the 
concentration ratio, a measure of potential market power. 
The structural characteristics were hypothesized to have 
a positive relationship with ROI through the implied 
linkage of anti-competitive behavior. 
Statistical Findings 
Regression and correlation techniques were utilized 
to test the variables as potential determinants of ROI. 
The hypothesized positive association with rate of return 
was supported for the two risk measures and for growth in 
demand but rejected for each of the structural charac¬ 
teristics. A model of return on investment was formulated 
based on the arguments presented in Chapters III and IV 
and the statistical analysis set forth in Chapter VI. 
The three measures of investment characteristics were 
combined into a cross-sectional, multiple regression model 
of ROI. Various statistical techniques including t and F 
tests and the Durbin-Watson statistic were used to evaluate 
the explanatory value of the equation. In a trial run 
using aerospace industry data, the model performed as 
expected. The prediction that aerospace ROI would be 
higher after consideration of risk and growth in demand 
was confirmed. 
Ethical drug industry ROI was studied by introducing 
data for the industry into the model to obtain a forecast 
of rate of return with variance, skewness, and growth held 
constant. After adjusting the resulting rate of return 
figure for possible forecasting errors, the ethical drug 
industry forecast and observed rate of return were com¬ 
pared. A Chow Test was used to verify that the drug in¬ 
dustry data belonged to the same regression as the all¬ 
manufacturing industries sample data. 
Comparing the forecast with the observed rate showed 
observed ethical drug industry average ROI to be below the 
rate that could result given the particular set of invest¬ 
ment characteristics exhibited by the drug industry sample. 
Therefore, the hypothesis was accepted that ethical drug 
industry average return on investment is the same as all¬ 
manufacturing industries average return on investment 
after consideration of investment characteristics. 
Conclusions 
Ethical drug industry average return on investment is 
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significantly higher than a11-manufacturing industries 
average ROI before consideration of investment characteris¬ 
tics. In fact, the industry's average rate of return is 
higher than that of nearly all other manufacturing indus¬ 
tries. However, inter-industry comparisons of rates of 
return without consideration of the determinants of ROI 
are misleading at best, and therefore, explicit attention 
must be paid to the determinants. 
Return on investment as a performance measure remains 
an ambiguous concept. The implications of various defini¬ 
tions of ROI are unclear, and there is continued disagree¬ 
ment regarding which form of the variable is best for use 
in inter-industry comparisons. Consequently, there is need 
for additional research regarding the definition and measure¬ 
ment of ROI. 
Of the many possible determinants of ROI suggested by 
previous studies, the ones discussed here are the most 
important, or at the very least, the most obvious. Each 
of the variables, however, is an imperfect explanatory 
variable and has various undesirable characteristics. 
A review of the investment characteristics shows one 
risk variable, variance of return, can be measured either 
spatially or temporally with researchers disagreeing on the 
proper method for inter-industry comparisons. Arguments were 
presented explaining the choice of the inter-spatial measure 
for this study. There has been only limited research 
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regarding skewness, the other risk measure. Review of prior 
research coupled with this study’s empirical results leads 
to acceptance of the hypothesis that investors desire 
positive and dislike negative skewness. The third invest¬ 
ment characteristic, growth in demand, was found to have a 
positive association with ROI as predicted in both this and 
most other studies of growth, but the logical framework for 
explaining the relationship requires additional development. 
All of the investment characteristics were statistically 
significant explanatory variables for rate of return. 
Hiere are a variety of possible explanations as to 
why none of the structural characteristics had the predicted 
positive association with ROI. For example, the concentra¬ 
tion ratio is a measure of potential market control which 
can lead to artificially high rates of return, but it may 
fail to distinguish between industries where this potential 
results in anti-competitive behavior and where the potential 
goes unexploited. Also, industries used in the Census 
Bureau concentration data may not represent the relevant 
product market. A case in point is the ethical drug industry 
which is relatively unconcentrated as a whole but may be 
significantly concentrated at the individual product level. 
The other structural variables were measures of 
possible barriers to competitive entry into an industry. 
Although R&D intensity appears to be an important ROI 
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determinant, the paucity of data severely limits the 
variable's usefulness in empirical research. Development 
of a more extensive data base very likely would result in 
researchers finding R&D intensity to be an important ROI 
determinant. Average company size exhibited moderate 
collinearity with the other independent variables indicating 
it has little independent explanatory value. It is possible 
that size was not significant because data from the Compustat 
Tape is mostly for large companies, and consequently, 
diversity in size was not present. At the same time, 
the theoretical framework for linking size and ROI is 
unclear. One additional structural characteristic, 
advertising intensity, was not included in the statistical 
analysis because most of the companies sampled did not 
report advertising expense separately. Prior research has 
generally predicted a positive ROl/advertising association, 
but empirical results have been ambiguous. 
This study clearly demonstrates the difficulties of 
formulating a multivariate model of ROI for use in inter¬ 
industry comparisons. Although the study successfully 
explained ethical drug industry ROI by statistical means, 
the need for additional research regarding the definition 
of ROI and its determinants as well as the need for better 
data were decidedly evident throughout. The fact that only 
three of the seven ROI determinants considered were statis¬ 
tically significant and included in the final model 
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emphasizes the problems of multicollinearity and overlapping 
created by relatively imprecise data and variable defini¬ 
tions. The conclusion is that future research would be 
better directed at refinements in definition and measure¬ 
ment of the ROI determinants rather than at attempts to 
build ROI models containing additional variables. 
By considering the individual and joint effects of a 
larger number of variables than prior studies, this research 
did produce a statistically significant explanatory model 
of ROI capable of explaining drug industry ROI. There 
are several possible explanations of why this research was 
successful in explaining drug industry ROI where previous 
studies have failed. First, this study utilized data only 
for firms primarily engaged in the manufacture of ethical 
drug products rather than data for both ethical and pro¬ 
prietary drug firms as in other research. Second, this 
study's more recent data may reflect changed economic 
relationships, both within the drug industry and between 
the drug and other industries, not captured in earlier 
data. Third, the model formulated includes more variables 
than prior models. Also, the definition and measurement 
of the variables benefited from research performed in the 
interim since previous drug industry studies were completed. 
Fourth, explicit consideration was made of possible statis¬ 
tical errors in both the regression equation and in the 
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forecast of drug industry rate of return. As a model of 
ROI, the regression equation is particularly useful in 
that it can be used without reference to noncompetitive 
structural characteristics. 
That ethical drug industry ROI can be explained 
statistically without reference to noncompetitive advan¬ 
tages, however, is far from proof that the industry 
operates under competitive conditions. The results also 
do not prove that the industry is uniquely risky. Even 
a conservative view of the findings, though, reveals that 
a considerable portion of the excess of industry ROI over 
the a11-manufacturing rate is explainable by the invest¬ 
ment characteristics of the industry. Ihe extreme reaction 
of some to the size of the difference between drug industry 
rate of return and that of other manufacturing industries 
should be modified by attention to these results. 
This study does not and has not sought to answer the 
normative question of whether ethical drug industry rate 
of return is too high. Such a question must be answered 
by social and political decision-makers. The goal of this 
study was to provide additional knowledge regarding return 
on investment in general and about the interpretation of 
ethical drug industry rate of return. 
Besides its value in explaining drug industry rate 
of return, the model can aid decision-making regarding 
regulation and control of specific industries. If an 
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industry is identified as having a higher rate of return 
than is indicated by its investment characteristics, 
regulatory agencies can attempt to force ROI down with 
less concern that their actions will result in the with¬ 
drawal of capital from the industry. Regulators may decide 
not to disturb other industries with relatively high rates 
of return which can be explained on the basis of high risk 
and/or growth in demand. Therefore, the model should be a 
welcome tool to aid in making predictions of the likely 
effects of regulating ROI. 
APPENDIX I 
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MEASUREMENT OF RISK 
The return on investment model contains two variables 
to measure risk: variance and skewness of the distribution 
of ROI. Variance is measured by the sum of the squared 
deviations of individual company rates of return around 
their industry mean. In view of the importance of the 
variable for acceptance of the model, this particular 
measure of risk deserves additional explanation. 
Variance as a risk measure can be stated more pre¬ 
cisely in equation form. Using the idea of expected utility 
maximization, the following utility function can be written 
with I being investment (or wealth) and Y being income, a 
random variable:1 
U = (Y ♦ I) 
ROI will be r = Y/I. Thus (1) may be rewritten as 
U = U (rl + I) 
(1) 
(2) 
The mathematical exposition follows that in Fred A. 
Arditti, "Risk and the Required Return on Equity," Journal 
of Finance (March, 1967) » pp. 19-36. 
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With E(rl) as the expected value of income, U may be 
expanded in a Taylor series about I + E(rl). Taking ex¬ 
pected values of both sides of the expansion produces: 
E(U) = U[l + E(rl)j +^0"(I+ Iui)u2 + (3) 
t3 
— U!,,(I + Iu^ )u *4- Terms involving higher 
3!« 1 ^ order moments. 
In equation (3), u^, u^, and u^ are the first, second, and 
p 
third moments of the probability distribution of ROI. 
Nothing is said above regarding investor attitude 
towards risk. If risk aversion is assumed, then the in¬ 
vestor has diminishing marginal utility for additional 
Income or wealth. Mathematically: 
U” (1)^0 (4) 
This states that the coefficient of the second moment, U£, 
must be negative. In other words, the greater the vari¬ 
ability of ROI, the lower the expected value. This leads 
to the hypothesis that there is a positive association be¬ 
tween variance and ROI. 
Different definitions of the second moment can be 
used to measure risk, including variance, semi variance, 
2 
For a discussion regarding the omission of higher 
order moments, see S. C. Tsiang, "The Rationale of the 
Mean-Standard Deviation Analysis, Skewness Preference, and 
the Demand for Money," American Economic Review (June, 
1972), pp. 354-371. 
136 
and standard deviation. One study that tested these and 
other definitions empirically found they were interchange¬ 
able as risk measures. Of six definitions, including the 
three mentioned above, the study reports: 
Die simple correlations among the first four measures 
are so high that one measure can be regarded as 
essentially a linear transformation of any of the 
others. The simple correlation coefficients in¬ 
volving the last two measures are less high but are 
still high.3 
Actually the differences in calculating these dif¬ 
ferent risk measures are not great. For example, the semi¬ 
variance is found in the same way as variance except only 
deviations below the mean are considered which reflects 
the investors fear of loss. As semi variance is infre¬ 
quently used, there is little familiarity with the measure. 
The only difference between the standard deviation and 
variance is that the latter is in squared units, and there¬ 
fore, larger deviations are given more weight.^ Under the 
assumption of diminishing marginal utility, giving greater 
weight to extreme deviations seems logical. 
3Bank Administration Institute, Measuring the Invest¬ 
ment Performance of Pension Funds (Park Ridge, illT: Aie 
Institute, p. 31^. 
^Based on the data used in this study, the standard 
deviation is highly correlated with variance (r= .98). To 
evaluate the effects of using squared deviations in cal¬ 
culating the drug industry*s forecasted rate of return, the 
standard deviation was substituted for variance. The fore¬ 
casted rate using the standard deviation was not signifi¬ 
cantly different than the rate calculated using variance. 
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A review of the literature reveals that nearly all 
researchers utilize either variance or the standard devia¬ 
tion as the measure of risk.-’ Preference for the standard 
deviation or variance seems to be about equal with no 
strong theoretical or practical evidence to recommend one 
measure over the other. As variance is a familiar concept 
that apparently explains ROI as well as any other definition 
of the second moment, it was chosen as the measure to use 
in the model. 
III. 
^A series of articles about risk are reviewed in Chapter 
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APPENDIX II 
INDUSTRY DATA 
TABLE 8 
RATES OP RETURN ON STOCKHOLDERS' INVESTMENT® 
Percent 
Industry0 1962 1964 1966 1968 Average 
Meat Products 5.2 8.5 5.3 8.1 6.8 
Dairy Products 10.0 ix .14- 12.0 11.0 11.1 
Sugar 8.1 8.3 10.0 8.0 8.6 
Candy 15.1 15.6 13.6 12.3 14.2 
Malt Liquor 8.3 10.1+ 11.0 12.1 10.5 
Distilled Liquor 6.1 6.5 9.1 7.6 7.3 
Fabrics and Yarn 7.3 9.0 10.5 8.3 8.8 
Pulp, Paper and Paperboard 8.2 9.3 10.6 9.2 9.3 
Paperboard Boxes 9.2 9.3 12.6 9.8 10.2 
Periodicals 6.3 14.4 20.1 12.7 13.4 
Petroleum Refineries 10.5 11.3 12.2 12.4 11.6 
Fabricated Rubber Products 8.I4. 10.1 11.5 11.9 10.5 
Footwear 9.1 10.4 13.1 14.8 11.9 
Glass and Glasswear 11.1 12.9 14.7 12.0 12.7 
Hydraulic Cement 9.8 8.8 6.1 7.0 7.7 
Steel Mills 5.3 8.7 8.5 8.2 7.7 
Iron and Steel Foundries 6.0 9.0 10.0 8.1 8.3 
Non-Ferrous Metals 7.0 8.9 14.4 10.3 7.7 
Machine Tools 8.6 11.4 17.0 12.9 10.2 
Radio and TV Equipment 10.2 13.4 19.8 15.0 14.6 
Motor Vehicle Parts 9.4 11.1 14.1 12.3 11.7 
Aircraft 12.1 13.7 II4..6 13.2 13.4 
Shipbuilding 
A11-Manufacturing Average 4h? 
6.1 
T3T71+ 
6.210.2 
T5TC TS75 TCtf 
Ethical k Proprietary Drug 17.1 18.9 21.1 18.8 19.0 
Ratio of Drug to All-Mfg. 2.0 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.9 
®Net Income after Taxes divided by Net Worth - Book Value. 
v 
Average for 12 largest firms in each industry. 
Source: U.S., Federal Trade Commission, Rates of Return in 
Selected Manufacturing Industries (Washington, Deb.: 
Government Printing office, l$?0j. 
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TABLE 10 
INDUSTRIES SAMPLED 
Industry Title 
Textile Products 
Chemicals - Major 
Chemicals - Specialty 
Drugs - Ethical 
Industry SIC Number of 
# # Companies 
2200 7 
2801 11 
2803 5 
2835 9 
2836 5 
2844 7 
2912 6 
324.1 k 
3331 k 
3400 6 
3430 6 
3540 5 
3560 k 
3570 10 
36IO k 
3670 11 
3721 5 
3811 k 
2082 12 
2841 k 
3141 5 
3221 
3651 
_6 
11+5 
136 
Drugs - Proprietary 
Cosmetics 
Oil - Integrated Domestic 
Building Materials - Cement 
Primary Smelting & Refining 
Machinery - Metal Fabricating 
Building Materials - Heat & A/C 
Machine Tools 
Machinery - Industrial 
Office and Business Equipment 
Electrical Equipment 
Electronics 
Aerospace 
Engineering, Lab & Research Equip. 
Beverages - Brewers 
Soap 
Shoes 
Containers - Metal and Glass 
Radio-TV Manufacturers 
Total Companies 
Total Companies without 
Ethical Drug Industry 
TABLE 11 
ETHICAL DRUG INDUSTRY SAMPLE 
1 Abbott Laboratories 
2 Lilly (Ell) & Co. 
3 Merck ic Co., Inc. 
4 Pfizer Inc. 
5 Sobering - Plough Corporation 
6 G. D. Searle & Co. 
7 Smith Kline & French Laboratories 
8 Syntex Corp. 
9 Upjohn Company 
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APPENDIX III 
NET RESIDUALS 
In using regression techniques there is always a 
question regarding the assumption of linear relationships. 
Hiis appendix offers some evidence of the relationships 
between ROI and the three independent variables. 
Figures 6, 7# and 8 are graphs of the residuals 
associated with the final ROI equation.^ Each graph de¬ 
picts a net relationship between ROI and one independent 
variable with the other two independent variables held 
constant. For example, Figure 6 relates ROI and variance 
with the mean values for skewness and growth substituted 
into the equation. Hie equation, the coefficient of mul¬ 
tiple correlation, and the partial correlation coefficient 
are all shown on the graph. These graphs are particularly 
useful as evidence of the validity of assuming a linear 
relation instead of some more complicated arrangement. 
*See Table 10 in Appendix II for the names of the in¬ 
dustries that correspond to the numbers on the graphs. 
il*4 
Fig. 6.--Net Residuals—ROI Vs. Variance. 
A11-Manufacturing (22 industries 
drug industry excluded) 
114-5 
*30“ 
28- 
26- 
2k- 
22-- 
20,, 
.6 
. s 
DRUGr # 
xnoustsVI 
0 \~z /—;+ 3 t 
Skewness 
Fig. 7*"-Net Residuals—HOI Vs. Skewness. 
All-Manufacturing (22 industries - 
drug industry excluded) 
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Pig. 8.--Not Residuals—ROI Vs. Growth. 
A11-Manufacturing (22 industries 
drug Industry excluded) 
llj.7 
APPENDIX IV 
THE EXCLUDED VARIABLES 
When a regression variable is not significant in a 
linear form, there is always a possibility that a dif¬ 
ferent relationship exists. The graphs in this appendix 
give a visual representation of the association between 
ROI and each of the variables excluded from the final 
equation because they are not statistically significant. 
Each graph shows the plots for the 23 industries, 
including the ethical drug industry, along with the least 
squares regression line for the a11-manufacturing sample.1 
The graphs are used to help ascertain if some more complex 
mathematical relation exists between ROI and each of the 
excluded variables than the formulation used. As shown 
by the individual plots, no such relationships are 
apparent. 
See Table 10 in Appendix II for the names of the 
Industries that correspond to the numbers on the graphs. 
The drug industry is not included in the all-manufacturing 
sample• 
1J4-8 
R&D Intensity % of Sales 
Fig. 9.--R0I Vs. R&D Intensity. 
A11-Manufacturing (17 
industries - drug 
industry excluded) 
149 
Pig. 10.—ROI Vs. Size (Total Assets). 
All-Manufacturing (22 
industries - drug industry 
excluded) 
150 
% 3°T 
28* • 
26 
22 
20 
5 . 
• H TNOUSTRV 
0 
4 
---1— 
5 6 
Size (Log1Q ) 
-t 
7 
Log Units 
Fig. 11.—ROI Vs. Size (Log10 Total Assets). 
A11-Manufacturing (22 industries - 
drug industry excluded) 
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k 
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• 15 JO* 
• It 
• 17 
* n. 
• \ 
• 8 
2 1 
0 -4- 
20 
—i-,-h 
30 ko 50 
Concentration Ratio 
(1^-firra value added) 
Fig. 12.—ROI Vs. Concentration Ratio (I4.-firm value added). 
A11-Manufacturing (22 industries - drug industry 
excluded) 
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0 1$ 50 60 
Concentration Ratio 
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Pig. 13.--ROI Vs. Concentration Ratio (8-firm value added). 
All-Manufacturing (22 industries - drug 
industry excluded) 
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-t—— ■ t ■ ■ -"H- ——t • 
30 40 50 60 
<* 
Concentration Ratio 
(4--firm employees) 
Pig. 14*—ROI Vs. Concentration Ratio (4-firm 
employees)• 
All-Manufacturing (22 industries - 
drug industry excluded) 
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